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ABSTRACT 
 Security in Mali has worsened in recent decades due to the escalation of the 
Tuareg insurgency, its connection to terrorist groups, and the military coup in 2012. The 
crisis in the north of Mali, as the Tuareg insurgency is also known, began in the 1960s, 
after Mali independence from France. From 1962 to 2012, a series of rebellions occurred 
in the north of Mali. The 2012 rebellion was the most complex and lethal because it 
involved foreign combatants and resulted in the invasion of the northern regions by the 
coalition of Tuareg and terrorist groups following the rout of the Malian army. The crisis 
has not yet being solved despite the national and international responses, including the 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) 
peacekeeping mission. This thesis seeks to formulate effective responses to the Malian 
crisis by examining the Tuareg rebellions and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as case 
studies. To formulate recommendations responding to the crisis, the thesis analyzes the 
involved groups and their funding and evaluates the effectiveness and inadequacy of local 
and international responses applied to the cases. It concludes that the mix of military, 
political, and economic responses to the crisis reinforced by good governance will 
produce effective results. 
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Security in Mali has worsened during the last few decades due to the escalation of 
the Tuareg insurgency1 and its connection to terrorist groups, as well as the military coup 
in 2012.2 The crisis in the north of Mali, as the Tuareg insurgency is also known, began 
in the 1960s, a few years after the country’s political independence from France. Stephen 
Emerson notes that the hard political and socio-economic situation after independence 
added to the ethnic and racial diversity in Mali, and the government’s weak economic 
investment in the north of the country pushed the Tuareg to resort to violence against the 
Malian authorities.3 
As a result, from 1962 to 2012, a series of rebellions occurred in the North of 
Mali. Among the Tuareg rebellions, the one in 2012 was the most complex and lethal 
because it involved the meddling of foreign combatants and resulted in the occupation of 
the northern regions of Mali by the Tuareg and terrorist groups after the rout of the 
Malian army. The Tuareg insurgency in Mali reached a crisis level with the return of 
Tuareg combatants from Libya and the connection of Tuareg insurgents to some regional 
terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for 
Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). According to Zoumounou, the ongoing 
Tuareg insurrection, triggered by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
                                                 
1 Wolfram Lacher, Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara region (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/13/; 
organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara-region-pub-49360. “Insurgency” is one of the terms that 
describes the fight of non-state actors against one state mostly to achieve the betterment of their living 
conditions or political objectives. The groups of rebels, bandits, secessionists, guerrilla, partisans and even 
terrorists are sometimes under covered by this definition, depending on the region or country they evolve. 
The recent history of humanity teaches as that most of the insurgency comes from minorities or regions 
believing to be disfavored by the central authority. 
2Andrew Clark, Pascal James Imperato, and Kathleen M. Baker, “Mali,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 
Last modified August 16, 2018, 9, https://www.britannica.com/place/Mali/2012-coup-and-warfare-in-the-
north. 
3 Stephen A. Emerson “Desert Insurgency: Lessons from the Third Tuareg Rebellion,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 22, no. 4, (2011): 670, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.573406. 
2 
(MNLA), reached the level of armed conflict, which, in addition to challenging Malian 
security, threatens the stability of the whole Sahel region.4 
The security situation in Mali degraded even more with the military coup of 
March 2012, which plunged the country in total chaos. The military’s unhappiness with 
the government’s conduct of the crisis in the north led to a revolt in which the defiant 
junior officers demanded better equipment to fight the insurgency. The mutiny escalated 
to a coup on March 21, 2012. Gathered around the National Committee for the Recovery 
of Democracy and Restoration of the State (CNRDRE), the mutinous group, led by 
Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, suspended the constitution and dissolved the 
government.5 This turmoil occasioned severe disorganization in the army, resulting in the 
occupation of one-third of Malian territory by the insurgent groups. The efforts of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to conduct negotiations 
between the junta and the political authorities assured the return to democratic order, and 
the former President of the National Assembly Dionkounda Traoré became acting 
president on April 14, 2012. 
Fighting on several fronts, the task was hard for Dionkounda and his government. 
Therefore, the administration called for international support. The degradation of the 
political and security conditions in Mali triggered the involvement of African and 
European countries, the United Nations, and the United States to support Mali responding 
to the multi-dimensional crisis. However, despite the presence of the blue helmets under 
the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and 
other international assistance to the Malian security forces since 2012, terrorist groups 
remain ubiquitous in the country, and the threat of instability and violence persists. 
                                                 
4 David Zounmenou, “The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis,” 
African Security Review 22, no. 3 (2013): 167, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/
10246029.2013.823794. 
5 Clark, Imperato, and Baker, “Mali.”  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
After its transition to democracy in 1991, Mali was considered a good example of 
democratization in Africa. Nevertheless, the security issue of 2012 arose a few months 
before the presidential elections and concerned several fronts: the dissatisfaction of 
Tuareg insurgents, the involvement of terrorist groups and the corollary of organized 
crime, and the military’s discontent with the government’s management of the crisis.  
Despite the existence of several studies on the Malian crises, no definite solution 
to the problem has been reached. In particular, no study has yet studied the interaction of 
the three branches of the crisis: insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime. Addressing 
all three will be essential to formulating an effective solution. Based on analytical 
examination of the evolution of insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime in Mali and 
Nigeria, this thesis therefore investigates the drivers of national and regional insecurity in 
Mali to answer the following question: What can the elites, security forces, and civil 
society organizations do to address the causes of insurgency, terrorism, and organized 
crime and to improve Mali’s precarious security environment? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The crisis of 2012 is the most significant insurrection in the modern history of 
Mali. This thesis contributes to the understanding of the national, regional, and 
international context of the crisis, which led in 2012 to the regions of Timbuctou, Gao, 
and Kidal falling under the control of terrorist groups. In addition to the political, 
economic, and military causes of the crisis, the connection of the insurgents to terrorist 
groups involved in organized crime renders the 2012 case more complex and difficult to 
respond.  
This thesis is particularly relevant to Malian policy makers because it provides 
insight into the flaws within the government and security institutions that have weakened 
the state’s authority and enabled the link between the Tuareg insurgents and terrorist 
groups. The research will provide recommendations responding to the predicament of an 
insurgency mixed with terrorism and organized crime. 
4 
This research is not only pertinent to the bureaucracy of Mali but also to its 
neighboring countries—Algeria, Burkina Faso, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, and 
Mauritania—because it provides regional strategies to combat insurgency, terrorism, and 
organized crime. Since 2005, with the connection of local extremist groups to 
international terrorist organizations, the Sahel region in Africa has become more exposed 
to terrorism.6 Porous borders, ungoverned zones, and weak security forces facilitate the 
spread of instability from one country to another. If Mali and Niger are used to facing the 
Tuareg insurgency, with its connection to terrorist groups, the entire Sahel region is today 
concerned with instability triggered by insurgency.  
This thesis is also highly relevant to U.S. government policy in Africa. After the 
American counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001, Al Qaeda shifted 
its operations from the Middle East to Africa by stirring up its cells there. AQIM, Al-
Shabaab, Boko Haram, and other terrorist organizations affiliated with Al Qaeda then 
spread insecurity all around the continent. Sharing with Mali the common enemy of 
terrorism, the United States engaged in the war against terror in Mali after the occupation 
of the North in 2012. Ted Poe, Chairman of the Congressional Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, highlights that as long as Al Qaeda’s 
affiliates remain in the desert of Mali, the United States should react to bring justice to 
the families of those callously killed by the terrorists.7 Thus, the United States and Mali 
have a common interest in fighting terrorism, which threatens the promotion of 
democracy and the respect of human rights to which Americans are highly attached. 
Finally, this study is relevant to the broader literature of security and democracy 
because it makes recommendations that civilian elites and security forces can implement 
to change the precarious security environment. Referring to the success and failures of 
the past responses to the crisis in Mali and elsewhere, this paper proposes widely 
                                                 
6 Olivier Walther and Denis Retaillé, “Sahara or Sahel? The Fuzzy Geography of Terrorism in West 
Africa,” (working paper 2010–35, CEPS/INSTEAD, 2010), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1803996. 
7 The Crisis in Mali: U.S. Interests and the International Response: Hearing before the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 113th Cong. 1 (2013), 4, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/
FA00/20130214/100248/HHRG-113-FA00-20130214-SD003.pdf. 
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applicable alternatives that blend political, economic, sociological, and military 
approaches.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the political, social, and economic 
causes of instability in Mali—and by extension in the Sahel region—and to investigate 
ways to counter insurgency, terrorism and organized crime. In service of this task, this 
literature review encompasses three sections: the first addresses issues central to the 
present research, the second, the nexus of insurgency with terrorism and organized crime, 
and the third, establishes counter-approaches to these phenomena. 
1. Origins of Conflict in Africa 
The Malian crisis shares a number of features with other African conflicts, 
including Nigeria, Senegal, and Somalia; the literature on conflict in Africa more broadly 
can thus give insight into the causes of the Malian crisis and, therefore, into potential 
solutions. The British Department for International Development, in its consultative 
document The Causes of the Conflict in Africa, highlights the primary, secondary and 
tertiary causes of the conflicts in the African continent, stressing inequality, state 
collapse, economic decline, history, and natural resources wealth as predominant causes 
of conflict in Africa.8 Furthermore, it identifies unemployment, the manipulation of 
ethnic groups, and the availability of arms among the secondary roots of conflict; the 
tertiary origins of African conflicts are regional and interlocking conflicts, as well as the 
wrong emphases in humanitarian assistance and inadequate mediation.9 
Several researchers support the findings of this document, pointing particularly to 
state weakness or collapse as a source of conflict, especially because it enables 
insurgencies and terrorist groups. According to Elizabeth Arsenault and Tricia Bacon, an 
ungoverned zone is a place that the government fails to control by the patent lack of 
                                                 
8 Department for International Development, The Causes of the Conflict in Africa, (London: 
Department for International Development, 2001), webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
+/http:/www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conflict-africa.pdf. 
9 Department for International Development. 
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state’s representatives.10 According to Robert Feldman, the state’s absence contributes to 
the proliferation of arms with its corollary of aggression and internal conflicts, 
particularly amid porous borders.11 This chaotic situation is then managed by the same 
weak authorities, leading to mismanagement and degradation of resources and further 
facilitating the conversion of ungoverned areas to illicit economic activities. 
Ultimately, the ungoverned space forms a haven where terrorist groups and 
insurgencies can operate without impediment of the police, army, or any other agency of 
state power and control. For example, Geoffrey Kambere posits that the Al-Shabaab 
insurgency in Somalia takes great advantage of the porosity of the borders, weak laws 
and judicial institutions, and the power vacuum created by the long-term absence of a 
central authority, which allows constant clashes between clans.12 He highlights that the 
failure of the government to contain the situation turned into civil war, in this case ending 
by the splitting of Somalia into zones under control of the state and others under 
separatist groups (Somaliland and Puntland).13 Similarly, according to Faye, the 
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) emerged in the 1980s from the 
grievances of local populations asking for more attention from the central government, 
and later becoming a violent insurgency claiming the independence of Casamance 
(southern province of Senegal).14 
                                                 
10 Elizabeth G. Arsenault and Tricia Bacon, “Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no 2 (2015):87, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/
1057610X.2014.977605. 
11 Robert L. Feldman, “The Root Causes of Terrorism: Why Parts of Africa Might Never Be at 
Peace,” Defense & Security Analysis, 25, no. 4 (2009), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/
14751790903416707. 
12 Geoffrey B. Kambere, “Countering al-Shabaab: A Case to Minimize Transnational Terrorist 
Threats against Uganda” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 10, http://hdl.handle.net/
10945/10626. 
13 Kambere. 
14 Wagane Faye, “The Casamance Separatism: From Independence Claim to Resource Logic,” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 7, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a451368.pdf. 
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2. Nexus of Terrorism and Organized Crime 
In addition to understanding the primary causes of conflict in Africa, it is essential 
to highlight the nexus of insurgencies and organized crime, especially drug trafficking. 
Irka Kuleshnyk points out that “while it is difficult to establish how widely terrorist 
groups are involved in the illicit drug trade, or the breadth and nature of cooperation 
between these two criminal groups, the magnitude of the numbers involved make the 
relationship worrisome.”15 That said, the chief of operations at the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency, Michael Braun, does quantify the problem, claiming in 2008 that 
of the 43 designated terrorist groups in the world, 19 profited from the drug trade.16 
Similarly, in a 2010 report, the U.S. Department of Justice noted that 29 of the top 63 
worldwide drug cartels were related to terrorist groups—and several of them were based 
in developing countries.17  
Thus, it is difficult to separate drug trafficking from terrorism because one 
intervenes or participates in the commission of the other. Trajan Evans illustrates the 
relationship between terrorist groups and drug traffickers by highlighting their unity in 
defending their common interests (territory and trade).18 Loretta Napoleoni likewise 
stresses that terrorists are significant non-state groups taking advantage of drug 
trafficking revenues while seeking to achieve political goals.19 Tamara Makarenko 
highlights that the nexus between terrorism and organized crime is currently complex 
                                                 
15 Irka Kuleshnyk, “Drug Trafficking and the Financing of Terrorism,” UNODC, 2008, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/drug-trafficking-and-the-financing-of-terrorism.html. 
16 “Exploring the Financial Nexus of Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime: Testimony 
before The Terrorism and Illicit Finance Subcommittee,” House Financial Services Committee (2018) 
(statement of Louise Shelley, University Professor and the Omer and Nancy Hirst Chair and Director, 
Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, Schar School of Policy and Government, George 
Mason University), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/03.20.2018_
louise_shelley_testimony.pdf. 
17 John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler, Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for 
Congress. CRS Report No. R41004 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 3, 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf. 
18 Trajan Evans, “The Link between Terrorism and Drug Trafficking,” University of Utah S.J. 
Quinney College of Law (blog), November 6, 2017, https://www.law.utah.edu/the-link-between-terrorism-
and-drug-trafficking/. 
19 Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks, (New 
York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 65–80. 
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because of globalization, and persists in spite of the discrepancy between terrorist and 
trafficking organizations’ political and criminal motivations, respectively.20  
Moreover, according to Francesco Strazzari, some evidence suggests that AQIM 
has been involved in the trafficking of cannabis and cocaine by protecting the traffickers 
in exchange of half the proceeds of drug commerce, which traffickers can pay in cash or 
in kind (vehicles or weaponry).21 At the same time, Louise Shelley emphasizes the 
involvement of Boko Haram in the smuggling of heroin and cocaine across West 
Africa.22 In 2013, the term “narco-jihadist” was usually used to refer to the groups 
involved in the North of Mali, resulting from the evidence on their involvement in drug 
trafficking. According to the International Crisis Group, the majority of the groups 
involved in the 2012 crisis in Mali took advantage of drug trafficking, which has 
increased since the 2000s with the quantity of cannabis and cocaine transiting through the 
North of Mali, and resulted in frequent clashes between the armed groups.23 According 
to Jean-Luc Peduzzi, the large portion of the Moroccan hashish production in 2010 (300 
tons) passed through Mali to reach Europe.24 
While drug trafficking is part of the revenue supporting terrorist groups, the 
abduction of foreign citizens also contributes to their cash flow. Adebayo posits that the 
flourishing business of kidnapping earned West African extremist groups millions of 
                                                 
20 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational 
Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime 6, no.1 (2004), 129–145, https://doi.org/10.1080/
1744057042000297025. 
21 Strazzari, The Role of Illicit Trade in the Logic of Armed Group Formation in Northern Mali; 
Francesco Strazzari, Azawad and the rights of passage: the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group 
formation in northern Mali, (Norwegian Peace Building Resource Center, 2015), 
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/
Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_Azawad_Dec2014.pdf. 
22 Louise Shelley, Exploring the Financial Nexus of Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and Organized 
Crime, (The Terrorism and Illicit Finance Subcommittee, House Financial Services Committee March 20, 
2018), www.usip.org/files/ressources/tlibans_opuim_1.pdf. 
23 International Crisis Group, Drug Trafficking, Violence and Politics in Northern Mali Africa, Report 
N°267,3-4, December 2018, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/267-drug-trafficking-violence-and-
politics-in-northern-mali-english.pdf. 
24 Jean-Luc Peduzzi, Physionomie et Enjeux des Trafics dans la Bande Sahélo-Saharienne 
[Physiognomy and Stakes of Traffic in the Saharan Region], (IFRI, Paris, 2010), 6, https://www.ifri.org/
sites/default/files/atoms/files/peduzzi_physionomie_et_enjeux_des_trafics.pdf 
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dollars, which facilitated their domination of the northern regions of Mali.25 Also, Thiola 
posits that during 2010, in the ungoverned northern zone of Mali, an armed group 
defeating the legal authority could amass around $300,000 monthly just for escorting 
drug convoys from the north of Mali to Niger.26 
In addition, according to the Financial Action Task Force, other confirmed 
sources of funding for terrorist groups in Africa include the extortion of funds from the 
local population, robbery, kidnapping for ransom, and cattle and other livestock 
rustling.27 Further, William Lind warns that other activities, including the physical 
transportation of cash, the trafficking of Rivoltril (a pharmaceutical drug), weapons 
trafficking, the trafficking of luxury cars, human trafficking, oil and cigarette smuggling, 
piracy, cybercrime, and fraud are also suspected sources of funding for terrorism in 
Africa.28 Moreover, the FATF reports that terrorist groups provide financial support and 
weaponry to each other in their respective operations.29 Nevertheless, Makarenko 
believes that a deficiency of sponsorship leads terrorist groups to engage in organized 
crime all around the world.30   
3. Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency 
Finally, resolving an insurgency requires knowing more than just how the group 
gathers resources; countering an insurgency also requires direct responses. Defining 
insurgency, David Kilcullen refers to a group of people or an organized movement using 
                                                 
25 Adebayo E. Ayedemy, Terrorism and transnational security threat in Africa: Global perspective, 




26 Boris Thiolay, “Cocaïne : Révélation sur la poudrière Malienne, Journal Express,” May 28, 2015, 
https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/cocaine-revelations-sur-la-poudriere-
malienne_1683121.html. 
27 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF): Terrorism Financing in West and Central Africa, 1–36, 
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-West-Central-Africa.pdf. 
28 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF): Terrorism Financing in West and Central Africa. 
29 The Financial Action Task Force. 
30 Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational 
Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime, 6:1, (Feb 2004) 129–145. 
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subversive acts and armed conflict against the state authority to overthrow it.31 Kilcullen 
adds that the insurgents could also be a group of people with ethnic, cultural, or identity 
grievance, or they could be a political organization trying to undermine the existing 
authority while looking for power.32 Under both definitions, insurgency directly 
challenges and undermines the sociopolitical order of the country in which it breaks out.  
According to Todd Sandler, countering terrorism needs the participation of all 
state actors and international organizations.33 Sandler also stresses that by applying a 
defensive mechanism, states’ targets will be difficult to reach, making terrorist attacks 
more expensive and consequently hampering their success.34 He maintains that the 
offensive approach focuses much more on proactivity. Instead of protecting targets by 
shielding or defensive measures, the proponents of the offensive approach deal with the 
terrorists by destroying their nests, killing members, and curtailing their funding.35  
These approaches can also be combined. Jessica Piombo believes that the United 
States’ counterterrorism initiative is a combination of military, governmental, and 
societal efforts focusing on the reinforcement of the states’ capacity through assistance to 
the security forces, prevention, and humanitarian actions to guarantee effectiveness in the 
war against terror.36 In Piombo’s view, because the rise of terrorism is the result of state 
failure in several domains, addressing the flaws of the security, humanitarian and 
governance sectors are the chosen areas of many partners’ actions against terrorism.37 
For instance, the U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and Kenya focuses more on 
building security forces’ capacities. Likewise, the European Capabilities-building 
                                                 
31 David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency: Fighting Back,” Farman Street Media Inc. (blog), June 2017, 
https://fs.blog/2017/06/counterinsurgency/. 
32 Kilcullen.  
33 Todd Sandler, “Terrorism and counterterrorism: an overview, “Oxford Economic Papers, 67, Issue 
1, (January 2015), 12–13, https://academic.oup.com/oep/article/67/1/1/2913015. 
34 Sandler. 
35 Sandler. 
36 Jessica R. Piombo, “Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview 




Mission (EUCAP) and the European Training Mission (EUTM) are not only training 
Mali’s military but also strengthening the capacity of civilians to help solve the problem.  
D. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES  
To address the insurgency in Mali, with its entanglement with terrorism and 
organized crime, in addition to the national and international approaches to the crisis in 
Mali, the most effective strategy will be to attack the core problem of bad governance by 
promoting democracy and addressing the economic and political aspirations of the 
population, which can stop the escalation of violence. 
Good governance is likely to be the most effective strategy because the military 
responses to the Tuareg insurgency and its affiliated terrorist groups are not resolving the 
problem, but contributing to its escalation. In the previous cases of Somalia, Nigeria, and 
Mali, the military responses to the crisis have shown limited results. The military 
approaches displayed against Al-Shabaab in Somalia displaced the group from 
Mogadishu but occasioned the spread of its influence to bordering countries (Kenya and 
Uganda). The same situation happened in Nigeria in 2009, with the radicalization and 
expansion of Boko Haram in West Africa after the military operation of the Joint Task 
Force killed the charismatic leader of the group. As in Mali, after the Serval Operation, 
logistically supported by the United States, the terrorist groups’ progress was stopped in 
Mopti (in the center of Mali), but the Malian population, as well as the international 
peacekeepers, continue to be targeted by terrorist attacks in the country. 
The considerable human and economic resources invested in responding to the 
African crisis through counterterrorism efforts, as well as humanitarian and 
peacekeeping, merit serious reflection on prevention. Williams notes that in countering 
terrorism, political solutions like prevention should come before the offensive and 
defensive solutions.38 Prevention reduces the number of sympathizers, producing a 
tangible effect with less effort. Thus, preventive methods can divert the hopeless from 
                                                 
38 Cindy Williams, “Paying for the War on Terrorism: U.S. Security Choices since 9/11, Real 
Homeland Security,” (presentation, ECAAR Panel on “ASSA Meetings, San Diego, California, January 5, 
2004), 3, https://worldpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/williams.pdf. 
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joining the insurgents, because many of their partisans believe they can receive from the 
groups the comfort and security that the state has failed to provide them. 
Economically, cutting the funding of the insurgent groups weakens their 
operability. Insurgent and terrorist groups are non-state actors, and their subsistence 
results from illegal activities. By establishing mechanisms that target the funding of an 
insurgency, every single country will succeed in decreasing the scourge of instability 
without bloodshed. It is commonplace that acquiring weapons and retaining combatants 
requires financial support. Shutting off the tap providing cash flow is therefore an 
important step in the fight against insurgency.  
Thus, attacking the core problem of power distribution by the promotion of 
democracy and addressing the political and economic aspirations of the population can 
stop the escalation of violence. Military, political, and economic responses must be 
simultaneously implemented to deal with insurgency. For instance, by addressing some 
political and economic grievances of the population of Casamance, Senegal succeeded to 
downgrade three decades of crisis with the Movement of Democratic Force of 
Casamance (MFDC), which sought the independence of the Southern region from 
Senegal. In addition, the relative peace observed during the implementation of the peace 
agreements between the insurgent groups and the government of Mali in 1991 and 1996 
revealed the importance of addressing insurgents’ political and economic grievances. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The foundation of this research is the literature on countering insurgency, 
terrorism, and organized crime, which is instrumental to analyzing the multi-dimensional 
crisis Mali has experienced since 2012. This thesis evaluates the causes of that crisis—
i.e., the Tuareg insurgency and its connection to terrorist groups, as well as their 
funding—and the national and international responses to the situation. The failure of 
national and international responses to the Boko Haram case in Nigeria contributes to our 
understanding of the Malian situation. As such, this thesis will use Boko Haram in 
Nigeria as case study. This comparison is particularly instructive, as the similarities and 
uniformities of the Boko Haram insurgency with that of the Tuareg of Mali help to 
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maximize our knowledge on insurgency in West Africa and measure the success of the 
counter-insurgency approaches in the region. This comparison serves as the basis for 
policy recommendations. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The remainder of this thesis is organized into four chapters: Chapter II focuses on 
the Tuareg insurgency in Mali from 1960 to 2012, particularly on its connection with 
terrorist groups and organized crime, and the responses of the successive governments in 
Mali and by the international community. Chapter III examines the case of Boko Haram 
in Nigeria, from its initiation to its escalation through its motives, grievances, and 
funding, as well as the responses against the group. Chapter IV seeks to answer the 
research questions and test the hypotheses. Particularly, drawing from the two case 
studies, this chapter aims to highlight the relationship between insurgency, terrorism, and 
transnational organized crime and the effects of this interconnected threat on the stability 
of Mali and Nigeria. Chapter V proposes recommendations to respond to instability in 
Mali and offers conclusion.  
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II. INSURGENCY-TERRORISM NEXUS AND RESPONSES  
A former French colony, Mali became independent in 1960 and since then has 
experienced several insurgent movements, mainly in the northern part of the country. The 
Tuareg insurgencies in the first years of independence were neutralized by the military, 
and the government of Mali started serious negotiations with the insurgents in the 1990s. 
The Tuareg were dissatisfied, however, with how these negotiations addressed their 
grievances relating to the improvement of the region and the living conditions of the 
population. Meanwhile the downfall of Muammar Kaddafi led to the 2012 crisis, with the 
Tuareg combatants returning from Libya and reaching Mali with their military equipment 
to join the insurgent group of MNLA. The MNLA insurgents then mixed with terrorist 
groups and took control of the northern regions. The ensuing violations of human rights 
and the threat to Mali’s territorial integrity caused by this nexus of insurgents and 
terrorist groups raised concerns among the national and international communities. Mali 
has used political, economic, and military approaches to respond to the crisis, which did 
not achieve tangible successes, thus leading to the sequential Tuareg rebellions.  
This chapter encompasses four sections. The first section analyzes the grievances 
and modus operandi of the Tuareg insurgency and its connection to terrorist groups, 
which is important for understanding the dimension of the crisis in 2012. The second 
section focuses on these same issues with respect to the groups (insurgent and terrorist) 
involved in the 2012 crisis, composed of both secessionist and religiously motivated 
groups. The third section of this chapter studies the funding of the groups, which provides 
insight into possible mechanisms that can prevent the groups from receiving support as a 
way to weaken and counter them. The last section will scrutinize the national and 
international responses that the Malian government and partner countries have 
implemented to counter the crisis.  
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A. TUAREG INSURGENCY AND ITS CONNECTION TO TERRORIST 
GROUPS 
The Tuareg are an ethnic group in Mali living primarily in the northern regions. 
Among the nomadic, pastoral, and desert peoples living in North Africa, Tuaregs are 
known as “Blue Men of the Desert” because of the indigo dye used in their traditional 
clothing. According to Alexander and Lebovich, in 2012, the Tuareg population was 
estimated at around 1.5 million people, dispersed across Algeria, Mali, Niger, Libya, 
Algeria, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania; the largest concentration, numbering 
50,000, live in Mali.39 The Tuaregs form less than 10 percent of the Malian population 
and are mostly Muslim; they are ethnically related to the Berbers.40 Well-adapted to the 
severe temperature of the desert, Tuaregs speak Tamasheq. According to Salomon, the 
Tuareg are the dominant ethnic group in the north of Mali, a region that includes Gao, 
Timbuctou, and Kidal, and the majority practice pastoral nomadism.41  
Tuareg society encompasses tribes and clans, strictly organized by class, 
including the nobles, the freemen, and the slaves. In the traditional Tuareg culture, the 
nobility and the freemen depend on slaves for physical labor and are supposed to take 
care of the slaves and their families. In the past, they levied taxes on farmers living along 
the Niger River for exploiting land the Tuareg believed to be theirs. This situation 
continued until the arrival of white people during colonization in 1892, and further until 
independence in 1960.  
                                                 
39 Alexander Thurston and Andrew Lebovich. A Handbook on Mali’s 2012–2013 Crisis, Institute for 
the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa, (2013), 9, https://buffett.northwestern.edu/documents/working-
papers/ISITA-13-001-Thurston-Lebovich.pdf. 
40 Kalifa Keita, “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali,” 
Small Wars & Insurgencies 9, no. 3, (1998):105-108, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592319808423221. Berbers 
are the descendants of the pre-Arab inhabitants of North Africa. Their population is scattered across 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. They speak various Amazigh 
languages belonging to the Afro-Asiatic family related to Ancient Egyptian. Tamasheq is a variety of 
Tuareg languages spoken by Tuareg people mainly in Timbuctou and Kidal in Mali. 
41 Hussein Solomon Mali: West Africa’s Afghanistan, The RUSI Journal, 158, no. 1(2013), 11, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.774635 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/030 
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The Tuareg insurgency in the north of Mali took a decisive negative turn in 2012. 
During the fourth rebellion,42 when national and international opinions focused on 
reestablishing constitutional order after the military coup of March 21, 2011, the 
insurgent groups came to an agreement with some violent extremist organizations to 
fulfill their goals. The terrorist groups such as AQIM and MUJAO, along with MNLA 
and Ansar Dine, conducted the killing of many soldiers, civilians, and the displacement 
of thousands of others. The coalition of insurgent and terrorist groups routed the Malian 
army and took control of the northern regions in 2012. However, the parties were not 
unified in their aims: MNLA sought the independence of Azawad, while Ansar Dine, 
AQIM, and MUJAO desired the creation of an Islamic State in Mali.  
B. PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS: GRIEVANCES AND MODUS 
OPERANDI 
MNLA in its essence is a secessionist group, while Ansar Dine and allies as Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West 
Africa (MUJWA or MUJAO) are extremist Islamic groups. According to Morten et al., 
the state’s failure to provide the basic needs to the population enabled terrorist groups to 
conquer slowly but surely in the north of Mali, seducing and building the confidence of 
the local population before the implementation of Sharia by AQIM, Ansar Dine, and 
MUJAO.43 The marriage between the MNLA and its allies did not last long amid their 
divergent political and religious goals. According to Arieff, MNLA ultimately became a 
                                                 
42 In the first and second rebellions (1960s and 1990s), the insurgents called for [?] the development 
of the Northern regions and the betterment of people’s living conditions. The secessionist claims 
surrounding Azawad started in the third insurgency of 2006. The Malian government’s promises to address 
the grievances of the insurgents in peace agreements ended the second and third rebellion before the 
blowout of the complex uprising of 2012. See Kalifa Keita, “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: 
The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali,”102–128, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592319808423221, and Stephanie 
Pezard, Michael Shurkin, Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreement, Local Conflict, and the 
Prospect for a Durable Settlement, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR892/RAND_RR892.pdf. 
43 Morten Bøås and Liv Elin Torheim, “The Trouble in Mali—Corruption, Collusion, Resistance,” 
Third World Quarterly 34, no. 7 (August 2013): 1279–92, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.824647. 
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victim of its former allies when it evicted from the conquered territories shared by 
AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine.44 
The objective of MNLA was the creation of Azawad independent state while 
AQIM and allies targeted the creation of an Islamic States in the north of Mali. 
Notwithstanding that divergence, the involved groups all together implemented 
asymmetric warfare, blending terrorist methods in their operations. Thus, the groups in 
addition to their connection to organized crime often carry out surprise gunmen attacks, 
suicide bombing and killing through improvised explosive devises across the continent. 
According to Boeke, both the jihadist groups (AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO) and 
MNLA used violence to affect the targeted people and trigger responses, but the former 
stressed the implementation of its religious ideology versus MNLA’s political 
ambitions.45  
1. National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) 
Tuareg insurgents and combatants from Libya created the National Movement for 
the Independence of Azawad in October 2011, initially under the leadership of Ibrahim 
Ag Bahanga. Bahanga died in 2011 near Kidal in conditions not yet elucidated and was 
replaced by Bilal Ag Cherif. The primary goal of the MNLA was secession from Mali 
and the creation of an independent secular state called Azawad.46 
The MNLA has both political and military branches. Part of the political wing of 
MNLA was based in Paris, with the mission of diffusing the group’s secessionist 
ideology across the world. Backed by the French, Mossa Ag Attaher, the spokesman and 
political representative of MNLA in Europe, benefited from access to the French media 
                                                 
44 Alexis Arieff, and Johnson Kelly, Crisis in Mali, CRS Report no. R42664, (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2013), 3, http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/ordbog/
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to spread propaganda against the government of Mali. For instance, after the occupation 
of the three counties of the North, MNLA declared the independence of Azawad on April 
6, 2012. France 24 and several other European media outlets released this declaration.47 
Azawad’s independence declaration had no effect because ignored by foreign 
governments and automatically refuted by Ansar Dine. According to Omar Hamaha, 
chief of Ansar Dine’s army, their group did not recognize MNLA’s declaration of 
independence because their goal was the expansion of Sharia in the entire country of Mali 
and not fulfilling political motives.48 
The MNLA also has a military branch. Amid the Malian military mutiny and coup 
in March 2012, some 1,600 Tuaregs in the Malian army deserted to join the MNLA 
movement.49 This defection in the army to the benefit of the insurgency helped 
consolidate the military branch of the MNLA, which engaged in an ongoing battle against 
the Malian army to free the north from Malian authority. Nevertheless, this branch of 
MNLA, despite including members of the principal ethnic groups in the north of Mali 
(Songhai, Arab, Fula and Tuareg), was weak compared to the religiously-motivated 
groups in the north; as result, those groups took control of the northern region, leaving 
MNLA with no territory of its own. Concerning the size of the military branch of MNLA, 
sources differ widely on the number of combatants estimated between 1,000 and 10,000. 
On one hand, Hama Ag Sid’Ahmed, spokesperson of MNLA, posited in 2015 that the 
Azawad national army had more than 3,000 combatants, comprising combatants from 
MNLA, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), and the Arab Movement of 
Azawad (MAA).50 On the other hand, Mohamed Ag Najem, the chief of the military 
                                                 
47 “Proclamation de l’Indépendance de l’Azawad” [Azawad’s Independence Proclamation], YouTube, 
video, 5:55, April 6, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-IkOHuUG4E. 
48 “Tuaregs Claim ‘Independence’ from Mali,” Al Jazeera, last modified April 20, 2012, 
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https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adt037. 
50 Le Point Afrique, Mali - MNLA: “Pas de Liens entre les Touaregs et les Terroristes [No Connection 
between Tuaregs and Terrorists],” June 10, 2015, http://afrique.lepoint.fr/actualites/hama-ag-sid-ahmed-
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branch, believes that its army is majority Tuareg and counts about 10,000 combatants.51 
In any case, the weakness of MNLA’s military branch was displayed after its clash with 
Ansar Dine in 2012, resulting from its expulsion from the occupied regions by AQIM, 
MUJAO, and Ansar Dine for the application of Sharia. 
2. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
AQIM is a terrorist organization, which comes from the Salafist Group for 
Preaching, and Combats (GSPC) based in Algeria. Created in 1998, the GSPC signed 
allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2006 and became AQIM. Founded by Abdelmalek Droukdel, 
AQIM operates and intends to spread Sharia in West Africa. In 2013, an estimated 1,000 
combatants divided into five brigades composed the group.52 AQIM is today the greatest 
transnational threat in North and West Africa due to its growth and diversity of 
combatants.53 According to Matei, since 1992, the successive governments of Mali 
focused on responding to internal threats, which severely weakened the army’s 
capacities, allowed AQIM, and its affiliates to take control of the north in 2012.54 With 
its Islamic, expansionist ideology, AQIM played an important role in the Malian crisis of 
2012 by invading the northern region with combatants and backing Ansar Dine against 
MNLA in their different clashes. AQIM mostly operated in the region of Timbuktu, 
considered in Mali to be a holy land and internationally recognized as a UNESCO 
cultural heritage site. The destruction of religious symbols, such as mausoleums, and the 
strict application of Sharia law marked the presence of AQIM in Timbuktu. According to 
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Martin, AQIM’s tenure in Timbuktu was detrimental not only to the culture but to the 
population, which was subject to amputations, stoning, lashes, and forced marriage.55  
Following the guidelines of Al Qaeda, its mentor organization, AQIM’s 
objectives encompass the elimination of Western influence—mainly French and 
American—from North and West African countries and the installation of 
fundamentalist regimes and Sharia law. According to West Point’s Combatting 
Terrorism Center, AQIM aims to overthrow the governments of Algeria, Libya, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—all of which it considers to be apostate—and 
install in their place a fundamentalist regime ruled by Islamic law.56 The threat is still 
present in Mali; despite frequent divisions, the group remains powerful. In 2015, the 
Malian General Directorate of States Security (DGSE) reported that due to the multiple 
divisions within the group, AQIM has around 200 combatants of three brigades in the 
Sahara.57 The announcement in 2017 of the creation of Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal 
Muslimeen (JNIM), resulting from the fusion of AQIM, Ansar al-Dine and al-
Mourabitoun, further denotes AQIM’s capacity to resurrect itself in pursuit of its 
ideology to expand Sharia in West Africa.58 
3. Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa MOJWA (MUJAO) 
Internal problems relating to leadership and ideology led to the division of AQIM 
in September 2011; MUJAO formed as one of the successors to AQIM. Founded by 
Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou, it was involved in the Malian crisis of 2012, with 500 
to 1,000 combatants divided into four sections.59 
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This group identified itself as a regional movement focused on spreading Islam in 
West Africa, rather than taking a global Islamic view.60 Profiting from the disorder in the 
region in 2012, MUJAO concentrated on recruiting more combatants, even from the 
south, to consolidate its position. According to Martin, MUJAO in 2012 became very 
strong in its religious propaganda, implementing Sharia in the north of Mali and 
subsequently expelling the MNLA from Gao for not sharing its religious agenda.61 
Also, in 2012, MUJAO took over most of the armaments that MNLA acquired 
from the barracks abandoned by the military deserters, allowing the group not only to 
control the region of Gao but to extend its power to the center of the country toward the 
region of Mopti. According to State for Worldview, in late 2012, MUJAO extended its 
control over neighboring cities from its position in Gao, including two principal towns of 
Mopti, Douentza, and Tininkoun.62 The progression of the terrorist group continued to 
the town of Konan, located at 30 minutes from the chief town of Mopti, before the French 
Serval operation stopped it on January 11, 2013. 
4. ANSAR DINE 
Ansar Dine is originally a Malian-based, religiously motivated group. 
Maintaining a relationship with AQIM and MUJAO—and sharing the same motivation of 
spreading Sharia—Ansar Dine enabled the involvement of these groups in the occupation 
of the northern regions of Mali in 2012. 
Iyad Ag Agaly, the former rebel leader who played an essential role in the 1992 
and 1996 peace agreements between the Malian government and the Tuareg rebel groups, 
created Ansar Dine, the “defender of the faith,”63 in December 2011. The creation of 
Ansar Dine occurred a few months after the nomination of Bilal Ag Cherif as the lead of 
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MNLA in 2011. In response to the selection of Cherif and the primarily political 
motivations of MNLA, Ag Agaly created Ansar Dine, an Islamic group oriented to the 
spread of Sharia throughout Mali, to compete with MNLA. Aware of its military 
weakness, since its inception Ansar Dine was closer to AQIM, from which it received 
substantial support. According to Martin, the cozy relations between Ansar Dine and 
AQIM—including shared conquered territory between the two groups—created 
frustrations among MNLA’s members competing with Ansar Dine.64 As in the case of 
MNLA, part of the arsenal of Ansar Dine as well as combatants came from Libya.  
Ansar Dine succeeded in applying Sharia in Kidal in 2012. For example, Martin 
writes that in Kidal, a couple was stoned to death in 2013 because of adultery, and others 
received lashes for misconduct; additionally, smoking, drinking alcohol, listening to 
music and playing collective sports were banned.65 The complicity with AQIM allowed 
Ansar Dine to strengthen its position and build a strong army, and continues to threaten 
the stability of Mali. In 2015, Ansar Dine claimed some attacks in the south of Mali and 
sent its members to conquer Cote d’Ivoire and other countries in the region.66 
C. FUNDING OF THE INVOLVED GROUPS  
The socio-political situation in Mali, coupled with the country’s geography, has 
made the northern regions more vulnerable to illegal activities such as human, drug, and 
cigarette trafficking, as well as kidnapping for ransom. MNLA, AQIM, MUJAO, and 
Ansar Dine have been actively involved in these types of illegal activities in order to 
sustain their revolutionary movement, making use of Mali’s porous borders with 
Mauritania, Algeria, and Niger. Though Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal are well known for 
their secular trade and arts activities, in the 2000s, smuggling affected commerce and 
changed the nature and the quality of people involved in the trade. Thus, in addition to 
donations coming from rogue countries, the terrorist groups in the north of Mali have 
engaged in drug trafficking, smuggling, and kidnapping to finance their activities. 
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1. Illicit Trade 
One way the insurgent and terrorist groups in northern Mali have funded 
themselves is through illicit trade, either by participating directly or by offering 
protection to others in the business, so to speak. According to Bakrania, AQIM, Ansar 
Dine, and MUJAO developed partnerships in illicit trade, and their combatants mutually 
support the accomplishment of the activity.67 Laremont notes that the traffic of cocaine, 
hashish, and counterfeit tobacco are part of AQIM’s revenue through the dealers’ 
protection against perception of certain amount of money.68 Since 2012, a flourishing 
illegal trade network prevails in the controlled zones in the north of Mali for the wealth of 
the parties.  
The actors based in the north of Mali took advantage of the new dynamics of 
international cocaine smuggling to gain a role in its trade. Because the terrorist groups 
controlled the region, they took advantage of drug trafficking by facilitating the trade of 
cocaine from South America to Europe through the Sahara Desert. The example of “Air 
Cocaine” in 2009 at Kidal is illustrative. This airplane, containing ten tons of cocaine, 
was easily discharged and dispatched in the desert of Mali. Not only did security forces 
fail to seize the drug before it crossed the boundaries of Mali, but also the investigations 
into it failed to achieve any successful results. 
Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari believe that Mali is one of the transit 
countries most afflicted by cocaine streams in West Africa; they highlight the significant 
quantity of drugs routed by 4x4 vehicles across the Sahara desert after the landing of “Air 
Cocaine.”69 According to UNODC, the growth of drug trafficking West Africa is directly 
linked to terrorism, with a significant involvement of AQIM in cocaine and cannabis 
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distribution.70 From 2014 to 2018, about 26 tons of cannabis, 42 kg of 
methamphetamines, 13 kg of heroin, and 9 kg of cocaine have been seized by the 
counter-narcotic agencies of Mali.71 A large quantity of hard drugs used in Mali comes 
from South America, while cannabis is produced by Burkina Faso and Ghana. All the 
terrorist groups are to some extent involved in drug trafficking in the north by direct 
involvement in or supporting the dealers.  
In addition, cigarette smuggling is well developed in the region. This activity 
generates an important amount of money. As with drug traffickers, armed groups to 
whom they regularly pay tax protect cigarette smugglers. The cigarette smuggling in the 
region is mainly focused on the Marlboro brand and is controlled by Abu Khaled 
Belmokhtar, also known as Mister Marlboro, an AQIM supporter.72 Cigarette smuggling 
led by Mister Marlboro is not only destabilizing West African countries by financing 
terrorism, but also threatening the European economy through the flow of cigarettes from 
Algeria to France, thus demanding collective counter efforts.73 From 2012 to 2016, 
smuggled cigarettes coming from Algeria to France increased by 300%.74  
2. Kidnapping for Ransom 
The insurgent and terrorist groups in the northern crisis of Mali have also used 
kidnapping as a way to raise funds. Selective kidnapping of western NGO workers has 
granted them thousands of dollars per person. Laremont believes that AQIM has received 
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$60 million–$175 million from ransom after the negotiation of the release of Europeans 
engaged in humanitarian efforts or research on the crisis in the region.75 Moreover, 
according to a CSS Analysis in Security Policy, AQIM has received in 2011 an average of 
U.S. $5.4 million in ransom per hostage.76 This example magnifies how kidnapping for 
ransom is essential to AQIM’s funding, if not its primary source of funding.  
Furthermore, kidnapping for ransom has become the springboard for the other 
groups. Most of the terrorist groups evolving in the north of Mali take advantage of this 
activity, which is an easy way to collect considerable amounts of money. This activity not 
only sustains the basic needs of the combatants, including recruitment and training, but 
also ensures that the groups can acquire weapons. According to Lacher, from 2008, 
kidnapping for ransom has brought in $65 million to AQIM, MUJAO, and connected 
intermediaries.77 
3. Human Trafficking 
The insurgent and terrorist groups in the north of Mali have further diversified, 
raising funds by embracing human trafficking as part of their activities. Amid crisis and 
economic misery, immigration has become the easiest way for many sub-Saharan people 
to escape their plight, even if the modalities of this escape often are illegal. Molenaar and 
Janssen highlight that the smugglers in connection with the local population are running 
the human smuggling industry, which earns them a considerable amount of money.78 
Also, Laremont posits that, in addition to drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom, 
human trafficking is part of AQIM and the Tuaregs’ activities toward the Mediterranean 
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through Tripoli and Algeria, from which those seeking illegal migration embark with 
traffickers; they are often ill-treated, and their relatives are obliged to pay for their release 
even if most of them do not reach Europe.79 The insecurity in the region, notably in 
Algeria, Libya, and Niger, makes the activity easier to undertake through the route of 
Agadez in the desert and via the Mediterranean from Libya. The ease with which the 
smugglers can travel across the Sahara with fewer impediments from security forces, as 
well as the openness of Libya to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea render this 
activity more profitable to its different players. 
Mali is a zone of transit and a destination of human trafficking. From 2000 to 
2007, 203 boys and 66 girls were trafficked abroad as reported by Malian officials.80 
According to the U.S. Department of State, Mali is deploying many efforts to respond to 
human trafficking, which concerns not only children and women but also adults 
generally, as highlighted by the official report in 2012, which revealed 32 cases involving 
63 defendants.81 Many migrants have died in the desert because of the hard conditions of 
transport and others have been sold as slaves in Mauritania or Libya. Smith mentions that 
Gao is the safest stop of the candidates for immigration from the Sahara Desert to the 
Mediterranean, where he emphasizes the inhuman conditions of transport, which has only 
a 10 percent success rate to reach Europe.82 Likely, children and women are often 
victims of the same fate. Many of them have become sex slaves in exchange for the fees 
of the trip or exchange for their life because the executioner does not hesitate to attack 
their lives in case of disobedience. 
                                                 
79 Larémont. 
80 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Human Trafficking, February 2009, 
102, https://www.unodc.org/documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf. 
81 U.S. Department of State, Mali: 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report, https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/
tiprpt/countries/2018/282703.htm. 
82 Alex Duval Smith, “Inside Mali’s Human-trafficking Underworld in Gao,” BBC Africa, last 
modified April 21, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32359142. 
28 
4. Donations  
Finally, the groups raise money through donations they receive from wealthy 
Muslims and organizations. Among the five principles of Islam, charity, also known as 
Zakat, occupies the fourth place. According to Lewis, Zakat is part of the tenets of Islam 
and extolled by the Quran, compelling every Muslim to redistribute 2.5 percent of their 
annual wealth to the needy in order to alleviate poverty in Islamic societies.83 The groups 
receiving these donations are mostly presented as the defenders of Islam, preaching the 
good news of the Quran or promoting Quranic schools; however, some of them embrace 
terrorist activities. According to the CRU Report, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Libya, and 
Kuwait through Islamic NGOs took advantage of the weakness of Mali’s efforts to 
promote education in the north to multiply madrasas schooling that often ends in 
radicalization.84 
In addition, some wealthy Muslims purposely support terrorist groups because 
they believe they are doing jihad, which compels all good Muslims to engage their body 
and wealth to support the religion against nonbelievers. Lewitt notes that the International 
Islamic Relief Organizations (IIRO) is the one the most prominent charity groups based 
in Saudi Arabia, with a strong link to Al Qaeda, and is suspected to have connections 
with fifty other terrorism-funding organizations around the world.85 Thus, terrorist 
organizations in the Sahel regions benefit from a large amount of money distributed 
yearly from rich Muslim countries as donation or individuals as Zakat.86 Also, the CRU 
Report highlights the increase of Saudi Arabian and Pakistani clerics in the region, 
leading to the conversion of many Tuareg to Wahhabism and the radicalization of Iyad 
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Ag Agaly, for which people questioned the exact motivations of religious NGOs in the 
north of the country.87 
D. RESPONSES TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TERRORIST AND 
INSURGENT GROUPS 
The Tuareg insurgency has prompted the Malian authorities to undertake several 
responses to contain the situation. In addition, Mali’s international partners, from Europe 
to the United States and the United Nations, have contributed strategies, resources, and 
manpower to rein in the threats in Mali’s north. The military, diplomatic and economic 
approaches in the peace agreements and development projects were ineffective at ending 
the conflict in the north of Mali, and later necessitated the international community’s 
engagement in the process. However, regarding the national and international responses, 
significant changes occurred in the settlement of the crisis, but many other efforts need to 
be undertaken for the stability of the whole country. 
1. National Level 
To respond to the successive Tuareg insurgencies, the government of Mali has 
implemented several methodologies. Typically, peace agreements are often followed by 
several months of calmness before the rise of a new insurgency. 
Military operations ended the first insurgency of 1960s, after which Mali 
preferred negotiation to deal with the Tuareg insurgencies. From 1990 to 1996, the 
second rebellion, led by Iyad Ag Agaly, attacked military positions, the state’s buildings 
and civilians. Because the leading cause of the second insurrection was related to 
demands for better living conditions, the insurgents reached an agreement with the 
government after several negotiation rounds led by Algeria and Libya. In 1991, the 
Tamanrasset agreement was signed and followed by the National Conference, which was 
concluded by the signing of the National Pact on April 11, 1992. Later, in 1996, during a 
ceremony named Flame de la Paix, the rebels were disarmed and their guns burned in 
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front of many witnesses to symbolize the end of the rebellion.88 Late in 1996, when the 
government was implementing the last agreement, the Tuareg took up arms against the 
nation, but organized under the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC), during the first 
mandate of Alpha Oumar Konaré, the first President democratically elected in Mali. Once 
again, the leaders of Bamako chose to negotiate with the group. The negotiations began 
first in Algeria and finalized in Sehba, Libya in 2009.89 Again, the insurgent groups did 
not care about the agreement and rebelled against the state, and another round of 
negotiations was opened. 
Finally, in the late 2000s, the Tuareg insurgency in the north of Mali has taken a 
decisive turn. From living conditions grievances, the group shifted its demands towards 
secessionism. One year after the creation of the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
in October 2011, the fourth rebellion broke out just a few months before presidential 
elections. The situation worsened, with many soldiers killed by insurgents, spurring the 
military to ask for adequate equipment to counter the danger. Not fulfilling these requests 
resulted in a demonstration by military spouses at Kati and Bamako. Finally, on March 
21, 2012, soldiers mutinying at Kati led to a military coup later in the evening. Taking 
advantage of this situation, when national and international opinions focused on how to 
reestablish constitutional order, the MNLA made an agreement with some violent 
extremist groups to take control of the north of Mali. While the MNLA sought the 
independence of Azawad, its allies dreamed of the creation of an Islamic State, as 
illustrated by the application of Sharia during the occupation.  
2. International Responses 
The international community in 2012 reacted to the Malian crisis, which had 
reached a multidimensional level. Several individual countries and organizations have 
been involved, including France, the United States, African Union, ECOWAS, the G5 
Sahel, the European Union, and the United Nations.  
                                                 





The Republic of France has been playing a tremendous role in the current crisis in 
Mali since the request for military intervention by the interim President Dionkounda 
Traore to his counterpart François Hollande. France’s reaction came at the right time 
because one day before its military intervention, the terrorist groups attacked the town of 
Konan in the region of Mopti, which is less than 700 km from Bamako, the capital city of 
Mali. Dan Stigall notes that France took advantages of its forces already deployed in 
Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger and Chad to engage in quick and decisive strikes to 
stop the jihadists’ progression toward the capital and to help Mali to regain confidence in 
the future of the fight against the insurgent groups.90 Similarly, Boeke notes that the 
jihadists groups, after having evicted and defeated the Malian army in their progress 
toward the center of Mali, were surprised on January 13, 2012 by the French military 
intervention.91  
The French counter-terrorist intervention in Mali, named Operation Serval (2012-
2014), was successful because it stopped the terrorist groups in the north of Mali. Jean 
Christophe Notin mentions that the success of Serval started with the engagement of the 
Special Forces and the quality of intelligence enabling them to operate in the steep terrain 
with less collateral damage.92 After the strikes on the jihadist columns in Konan, which 
created severe damage and disorder in the terrorist groups, Operation Serval continued to 
fight the terrorist groups into their last confinement in the regions of Gao, Timbuctou, 
and Kidal by the end of March 2013. Stigall notes that the French military operation, in 
addition to killing many of the terrorist combatants including Ahmed El Telemsi, the 
creator of MUJAO, in 2014, it weakened the logistical and operational capacity of the 
terrorist groups by destroying their bases and dismantling drug trafficking networks, the 
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primary funding of the groups.93 While many witnesses believe that Operation Serval 
allowed Mali to recover one-third of its territory, other people are questioning the legality 
and the duration of the French army presence in the country. Referring to the 
involvement of West African soldiers in the war of Algeria, World War I and II alongside 
France, we can conclude that the two countries are historically linked, and France’s 
commitment through Operation Serval was a type of recognition toward Mali.  
At the end of Operation Serval, another French operation took over the fight 
against the terrorist menace in the Sahel region. The ongoing Barkhane contingent, 
composed of 3,000 soldiers, aims to enhance the counterterrorism efforts of Mali and 
other Sahel countries. The French Ministry of Defense posits that Operation Barkhane 
targets the capacity building of the recipient countries to defuse and defeat the current 
terrorist threat and prevent the settlement of new groups.94 
b. The United States  
The United States’ involvement in the Malian crisis was crucial, starting with its 
backing of Operation Serval and continuing through the implementation of diplomatic, 
economic and military responses to the crisis. According to Olsen, the United States 
backed Operation Serval by supplying aerial support as well as refueling aircraft and 
troop transport from African countries to Mali.95 He also highlights United States’ 
engagement in policymaking and the fight against terrorism through the State 
Department, the Pentagon, States Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).96 The United 
States’ presence in Mali through its agents seeks to achieve the pillars of its foreign 
                                                 
93 Stigall, “The French Military Intervention in Mali, Counter-terrorism, and the Law of Armed 
Conflict,” 14. 
94 Maxime H.A. Larivé, “Welcome to France’s New War on Terror in Africa: Operation Barkhane,” 
The National Interest, August 7, 2014, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-frances-new-war-terror-
africa-operation-barkhane-11029. 
95 Gorm Rye Olsen, “Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy: the USA and the European Union in 
Somali and Mali,” European Security 22, no.3 (2014): 290 to 94, https://doi.org/1080/
09662839.2014.884074. 
96 Olsen, 290–94. 
33 
policy toward Africa, which drastically changed after September 11, 2001, by focusing 
on the promotion of democracy, the provision of an essential mechanism for economic 
development and assistance for peace and security. According to Olsten, the nature of the 
United States’ assistance will not only prevent the deployment of U.S. troops on the 
ground, but also build the Malian force’s capabilities through training and counseling so 
that they can themselves meet the challenges, as one way to bring African solutions to 
African problems.97 The Security Governance Initiative (SGI) was initiated by President 
Obama during the United States’ African Leader’s Summit in August 2014 to give new 
vision to the security environment in Africa. Currently, the United States and Mali, with 
other recipient countries of SGI, are working together to develop the security sector’s 
readiness to face the security challenges by being more accountable to civilians.  
Also, the involvement of the U.S. has also been valuable when it helped the 
deployment of French troops, information collection methods, and the paramount effort it 
has been implementing through AFRICOM. In the single year of 2014, AFRICOM has 
organized ten exercises, 55 operations and 400 seminaries with 49 African countries and 
the building of drone’s surveillance bases in Djibouti, Niger, Kenya Burkina Faso, and 
Seychelles.98  
c. African Union (AU) 
As a regional umbrella organization, the African Union was slow in taking action 
for several reasons, including its leadership conflicts and the difficulties in coming up 
with sound and possible decisions. During the AU’s Peace and Security Council of the 
315th meeting at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 23, 2012, Chairman Jean Ping invited 
the junta to a quick constitutional return and promised the sending of a commission to 
evaluate what is occurring in Bamako.99  
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AU mostly relied on ECOWAS by backing the actions undertaken by ECOWAS 
during its 365th meeting and affirming its total backing to Alassane Ouattara and his 
mediators for their work in the settlement of the Malian crisis. Therefore, Lecocq et al. 
believe that the AU was less effective in Mali’s mediation process because the 
organization faced internal challenges as well as leadership conflicts, which hampered its 
effectiveness.100 The AU, instead of being a leader in the conflict was playing the 
secondary role.  
d. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
After the military coup of 2012 and the invasion of three regions of the north, the 
regional community through the Economic Community of West African States engaged 
in the crisis resolution through several steps. Worrying about the return of constitutional 
order, it displayed many attempts to coerce the junta to renounce to the power. One 
ECOWAS measures was the imposition of an economic embargo on Mali forbidding any 
goods coming in and out. According to Lecocq et al., ECOWAS was so concerned by the 
crisis it hastily taught about the deployment of military force in Bamako to secure civilian 
power and even propose the nomination of Cheick Modibo Diarra as Prime Minister.101 
Later, ECOWAS’s involvement became necessary between not only the junta and the 
civilian power but also between Mali and the insurgent groups after the French 
intervention to kick out the nexus Salafist groups. Despite the return to constitutional 
order in April 2012, the chief of the junta Amadou Haya Sanogo continued to influence 
the state’s power, if not menace it.102 For example, regarding the government of 
Dionkounda Traore, as Lecocq et al. note, “In mid-December, Captain Sanogo’s men 
arrested Diarra, and he was forced to resign.”103  
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Furthermore, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, president of Cote d’Ivoire and 
chairman of ECOWAS, appointed Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso, to lead 
the mediation between the Malian parties. The negotiation plot also opened the door to 
the creation of many other organizations wanting to take advantage of it. Boutellis and 
Zahar highlight that in June 2013, as a prelude to the presidential and parliamentary 
elections, the Malian protagonists met at Ouagadougou and settled the initial peace 
agreement, further finalized in Algeria.104 In addition, to take advantage of the process 
conducted by ECOWAS, other groups or associations gathering northern inhabitants 
including Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), the Arab Movement of Azawad 
(MAA) and the self-defense militia the Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces 
of the Resistance (CMFPR) were created in accordance with their ethnicity and 
grievances.  
After the presidential elections in Mali in 2013, which culminated with the 
election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, ECOWAS continued to be involved in the process of 
mediation to end the conflict in Mali. The latter round of peace negations took place in 
Algeria. Therefore, based on the size of the groups involved in the negotiations, it was 
hard and grueling at first, but they eventually reached agreement on some points. The 
most problematic point was the unity of Mali. According to Boutellis and Zahar, the 
Algerian-led mediation was so complex not only because of the parties involved but also 
because of the points of divergence, it took at least one year and went through five phases 
before reaching an agreement.105 Thus, the mediation of ECOWAS was central in the 
Mali crisis. The inter-Malian dialogues began by off-siding the junta and finally ended 
through a peace agreement pre-signed in Alger and finalized at Bamako on May 15, 
2015.  
On the other hand, the Malian population was divided into proponents and 
opponents of ECOWAS’s involvement in the crisis. The proponents of the junta believed 
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that ECOWAS’s conduct was no more than meddling in Mali’s internal affairs. The most 
energetic political party to support the junta was the party of African Solidarity for 
Democracy and Independence (SADI), which in connection with other civil society 
organizations created the Popular Movement of March 22, 2012 (MP 22). Also, the 
Coordination of Patriotic Organizations of Mali (COPAM) created after the military 
coup, and composed associations advocated its membership to the junta and derecognized 
the transitory government of Dionkounda Traore. Thus, Bleck et al., argue that the junta 
followers, disappointed by the ATT’s regime because they considered it non-democratic 
and defended the military coup as a way to rebuild democracy.106 The junta backer’s 
illustrated their defiance of the transitory president and his government by several 
attempts to sabotage the government’s actions as well as the efforts of ECOWAS. 
According to Lecocq et al., on May 21, 2012, after a march organized by the supporters 
of the junta, helped by the military, they broke the presidential palace security barriers 
and beat the president to death.107 At the same time, many of the political parties among 
which ADEMA, MPR, CNID, URD were backing ECOWAS and the transitory 
government despite military retaliation. 
e. The G5 Sahel 
Aware of the complexity of the situation in Mali, and the increase of terrorism 
and organized crime in the Sahel, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad 
decided to gather and create a regional cross-borders joint force dedicated to fighting 
against their common adversaries in the Sahel. According to Tull, the European Union is 
committed to supporting the G5 Sahel in its mission but prefers capability building with 
quick results rather than equipping a regional military force with a mission that could be 
diverted in the long run.108 Moreover, during the first years of G5 Sahel under Malian 
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leadership, the headquarters of the organization located in the fifth region of Mali, 
vanished in terrorist attack claim by Al Qaeda. According to France 24, a car bombing at 
the headquarters of G5 Sahel on June 29, 2018, killed five people, two soldiers and one 
civilian along with the two terrorists.109 However, the terrorist attack against the 
headquarters did not stop the joint force actions; on the contrary, it motivated the 
countries to be more engaged in the fight. The perspicacity of the heads of states 
composing the G5 Sahel is now paying off because they changed the location of the 
headquarters and became more present in the field. Long accused of being in association 
with terrorist groups, the Qatar government joined the groups funding the establishment 
of the G5 Sahel’s capacity by donating twenty four armored vehicles to the organization 
on December 2018, to support them fighting against terrorism and organized crime. In 
the same period, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also promised to 
support G5 Sahel up to $150 million.110 
f. The European Union (EU) 
The multi-dimensional crisis of 2012, with its corollary of the army failure and 
the loss of one-third of the Malian territory, led Europeans foreign ministers to meet on 
the case. On December 10, 2012, a crisis management concept in Mali endorsed by the 
EU foreign ministers concluded on the urgent necessity of establishing a training mission 
in Mali with the deployment of 200 instructors along with assistance and protection 
personnel during 15 months in Bamako for 12.3 million euros.111 The European Union 
started the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) in 2013, and the European 
Union Mission to support the Malian Security Forces’ Capabilities (EUCAP) in 2014. 
EUTM was adopted based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2071 
(2012) on Articles 42 and 43, through which the Council adopted Decision 2013–34 
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establishing the European Union training mission in Mali.33 The first purpose of EUTM 
as noted in the resolution was to offer military assistance and training to the Malian 
armed forces, restore its military capability and enable them to conduct operations to 
recover the territorial integrity of the country.  
In addition to the military training mission, the European Union, aware of the 
complexity of the threat, decided to set another mission to support the military already 
engaged in Mali. EUCAP Sahel Mali is the name of the mission created by Decision 
2014/219 / CFSP on April 15, 2014 CSDP of the European Council. The objectives of 
this mission are to improve the rule of law by reinforcing the units’ capacity in their daily 
job in coordination with MINUSMA and assist the reform of the security sector.112 
Through these organizations, the European Union magnifies its positive support to the 
Malian Defense and Security forces in their sovereign missions to meet the current 
insecurity challenges by training and providing equipment. 
g. The United Nations (UN) 
The United Nations have engaged in a timely manner to counter the terrorist 
invasion of Mali. In this connection, Stigall notes that the U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 2071 of October 12, 2012, and Resolution 2085 of December 20, 2012, 
requested the members to undertake all diplomatic and military efforts to help build the 
Malian security forces’ capabilities.113 Thus, they can recover the totality of the territory 
and fight AQIM and its affiliate in the country, and the coordination of actions to rebuild 
state authority to rule the entire country. To achieve this mission, the U.N. deployed the 
African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) composed of 
representatives of 21 African countries for one year. Because of the complexity of the 
situation, and the incapacity of AFISMA to deal with the challenges, in July 2013, the 
United Nations deployed international peacekeepers to Mali as part of the 
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Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission. This mission superseded the earlier 
AFISMA in the number of soldiers, logistics and purposes to stabilize the country.  
MINUSMA, since its inception, became the target of terrorist groups, and it is 
considered today to be one of the most dangerous peacekeeping missions of the United 
Nations. According to Kevin Sief, from 2014 to 2017, the peacekeeping mission of Mali 
has registered 118 deaths, placing MINUSMA among the deadliest U.N. missions in the 
world.114 Likewise, Boeke highlights that in 2015, MINUSMA counted a number of 
casualties never before recorded in any U.N. peacekeeping missions.115 The ubiquity of 
terrorism in the country that uses asymmetric methods to kill the maximum number of 
people is a challenge that MINUSMA and Malian authorities are facing. This situation 
led citizens to question the necessity of the peacekeeping mission in Mali. While some 
believe in the necessity of the mission, others think that MINUSMA is needless because 
it is unable to prevent terrorist attacks and provide stability despite the robustness of its 
mandate, the13,289 troops and 1,920 police personnel deployed in Mali.116 Thus, some 
people believe that the building of the Malian security forces’ capacities can be a good 
rampart of the stability of the country. Carvalho and Kumalo note that an alternative of 
the population’s distrust on MINUSMA’s goals should start with the building of the 
police forces’ ability by providing training and necessary logistics for their mission 
instead of scattering efforts trying to perform everything jointly.117  
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To respond to the northern crisis, the Malian government implemented several 
peace agreements without success. At the turning point in 2012, ECOWAS played an 
essential role by its representatives, who managed everything necessary to persuade the 
junta to return to constitutional order, to establish a peace agreement and the reinforcing 
of the security forces’ abilities. France’s intervention not only saves Mali to collapse but 
also amplified its hegemony in Africa. Even though France’s military intervention was 
salutary, it was criticized for supporting the political branch of MNLA, which is based in 
Paris and used international communication channels for propaganda. Also, the failure of 
Operation Serval to deal with Ansar Dine of Iyad Ag Agaly and the stopping of Malian 
troops from entering Kidal has sparked many interrogations. The United Nations also 
followed suit of its predecessor in settling the crisis when its security council adopted the 
resolution on the peacekeeping mission in Mali. Moreover, the United States through 
AFRICOM, USAID and other branches is deploying utmost military, diplomatic, and 
economic efforts for the stability of the Sahel region. 
However, despite the paramount efforts and strategies implemented to stop the 
bloodshed resulting from instability, Mali is continuing to experience the dictate of 
insurgent and terrorist groups. On January 20, 2019, Malian Army Day, 10 UN 
peacekeepers were killed and 20 others injured in a terrorist attack targeting the camp at 
Aguelhok in the region of Kidal.118 Thus, insurgent and terrorist groups are the major 
obstacles to Malian stability, which response necessarily passes through the fulfillment of 
the entire population’s socio-economic aspirations. Despite the tremendous effort already 
deployed, the country is still staggering and need more aid and assistance to counter the 
insurgency, terrorism and organized crime. For the goal of national reconciliation, it is 
essential for the Malian government to start with an inclusive development approach, 
which will challenge the power of violent groups who receive citizens’ support.  
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III. THE CASE STUDY OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA 
Like Mali, Nigeria is experiencing a social movement led by Boko Haram, the 
current moniker of an Islamic organization in Nigeria. Examining the case of Nigeria can 
therefore give insight into possible approaches to effectively combat the ongoing crisis in 
Mali. Originally an insurgent group against Nigeria’s federal government and Western 
education, Boko Haram in 2000s, the group over time transformed and adopted deadly 
methods. Advocating the strict respect of the principles of the Holy Koran, Boko Haram 
radicalized and adopted a terrorist posture. The group increased its lethal actions in the 
last years of the charismatic leader Mohamed Yusuf and became more brutal and 
ubiquitous in Nigeria when Abubakar Shekau took control after the extrajudicial killing 
of Mohamed Yusuf. 
This chapter will study the origins of Boko Haram from its initiation as an 
insurgent group to its current scale as a terrorist organization dedicated to the spread of 
Islamic law inside and around Nigeria. The chapter will continue by describing the 
grievances and modus operandi of Boko Haram, such as its targeting of Western 
education as sinful and its anger with the Nigerian government and its representatives for 
promoting what the group opposes. A section will also examine the funding of Boko 
Haram, as well as the national and international responses implemented against it. 
Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that the fight against Boko Haram has not yet been 
successful as the group continues to grow by expanding to bordering countries.  
A. BACKGROUND OF BOKO HARAM (BH) 
Boko Haram, also known as Jama’atu Ahl As-Sunna Li d’awati Wal Jihad, or the 
Group Devoted to the Spreading of the Prophet Mohamad’s Instructions and Jihad, is 
recognized as one of the most complex and lethal insurgencies in the history of 
Nigeria.119 Although Nigerian governments experienced several rebellions in the recent 
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past including the Niger Delta militancy, Boko Haram is well-known for its influence and 
the unprecedented level of brutality it has carried out in the country. Nigeria with its 
population of 119,000,000120 is divided into hundreds of ethnic groups, dominated by the 
Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo, and sharing the religions of Islam and Christianity.121 
Sect-like at the beginning, BH believes that the implementation of Sharia can help fight 
against depravity and corruption in Nigerian society.  
Most scholars agree that Muhammad Yusuf established a religious sect between 
1970 and 2009, and several changes took place before it became BH.122 Predominantly 
composed of Kanuri ethnic group members,123 BH quickly reached national and 
international notoriety owing to the lethal nature of its actions and the ends it was 
seeking. BH radicalized over time by rebelling against the perceived wrongdoing of the 
government and clashing with Christians. In June 2009, after security agents detained 
several members of BH while riding motorbikes without a helmet in a convoy to bury a 
member who died in car accident, the group began to protest fiercely against the law. 
According to Friedman, the incident of the funeral procession was followed by protests 
from BH, which were militarily defused and resulted in the killing 700 people, among 
them Mohammed Yusuf, as well as the arrest of several combatants and the seizure of 
important bomb-making materials.124 
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Mostly active in the northeast part of Nigeria where it was created and held bases, 
BH has stretched its impact into the nearby states including Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. 
Boko Haram’s actions in the region, as well as the Nigerian police counterinsurgency 
from 2009 and 2014, killed more than 7,000 people and displaced more than 3 
million.125 After the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf by Nigerian police, 
Abubakar Shekau took control of the group. Boko Haram became more lethal than before 
and a great menace to the Nigerian government, which accordingly took many initiatives 
to counter it. Likewise, Boko Haram deployed strategies to defeat the Nigerian army by 
recruiting more combatants and killing as many soldiers as possible to defy the Nigerian 
state.  
B. BOKO HARAM’S GRIEVANCES AND MODUS OPERANDI 
BH targets Western education as sinful and aims for the rigorous application of 
Sharia in Nigeria and abroad. The group is implementing several terrorist methods to 
attain its objectives, including suicide bombings and sporadic shooting attacks and 
kidnapping targeting not only Nigeria, but also its bordering countries. 
1. Grievances 
Boko Haram primarily targets Western education, an effort controversial in the 
religious circle because many Muslims believe that Western education does not harm the 
ethical practice of the religion, and Boko Haram has failed to cite any passage of the 
Holy Koran that stipulates that Western education is sinful. Loimeier highlights that 
Boko Haram’s contempt for Western education is based on criticisms written by 
Abubakar Abdallah, a Saudi Arabian Wahhabi scholar, depicting Western education as 
the source of all kinds of diversions and impediments to Muslim fulfillment.126 By 
contrast, according to Umar Aminu Mohamed, it is unfair to treat a Muslim as an infidel 
only for accepting Western education.127 Moreover, the attacks against European 
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education as sinful is not reflected in the behavior of Boko Haram’s leaders, who 
demonstrated the opposite of what they claimed in their daily preaching. Muhammed 
concludes that, contrary to the vision of the sect against Western education and way of 
life, Yusuf, the leader of Boko Haram, led a Western-like lifestyle with luxurious cars, 
paying for the services of doctors and attorneys and even sending his child to Western 
schools.128 In any case, despite its failure to convince the sizeable Muslim community of 
its reasons for attacking Western education, Boko Haram has never stopped promoting 
grievances against the West.  
The killing of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 quickly shifted Boko Haram’s 
motivations from targeting Western education to revenge killings against politicians, the 
military and the police, whom they considered responsible for the killing of their leader. 
According to Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Boko Haram’s revenge killing became 
the third step of its reorganization.129 Boko Haram’s hatred of Western education then 
reached the worldwide concern in 2014, with the abduction of 200 schoolgirls in the state 
of Borno. Agbiboa and Maiangwa believe that the abduction of the 200 girls of Chibok 
was the reply to the coercive methods used by Nigerian security forces to pressure Boko 
Haram leaders to the negotiation table by detaining over 100 wives and children of the 
sect leaders.130  
Moreover, Boko Haram has been animated by the creation of an Islamic Caliphate 
in which Sharia will be the overriding law. Abu Qaqa, the representative of Boko Haram 
in 2012, mentioned that the group was disappointed by the Nigerian leaders and promised 
to fight until the establishment of Sharia law in Nigeria and beyond.131 Clearly stated, 
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the implementation of Sharia in Nigeria is one of the ultimate goals of Boko Haram. 
Thus, Boko Haram multiplied its attacks in the northern part of Nigeria to increase its 
domination and to conquer vast territories with no regard to other religious groups. 
According to Mohamed, the idea of an Islamic Caliphate darkened the vision of Boko 
Haram, which disregarded the established Islamic order and disrespected the religious 
leaders they considered to be corrupted and who favored Western culture in the 
country.132 He continues by arguing that the aim of establishing an Islamic state in 
Nigeria led Boko Haram to target most of the northern and central regions of the country, 
with endless consequences on the population. However, BH’s aim of the creation an 
Islamic Caliphate was influenced by external proponents like Al Qaeda and ISIS, who 
believe in using this channel to reach their expansionist and ideological objectives.  
2. Modus Operandi  
Spreading violence is the operation model of BH. The starting point of this model 
was the killing of the former leader Yusuf. According to Comolli, the shared affinities of 
Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in 2010 was the beginning of its “internationalization” by 
scattering its influence throughout Nigeria’s border countries—Niger, Cameroon, Chad, 
and beyond in Mali—by its involvement in recruiting combatants and in operations for 
other terrorist groups.133 According to Africano Abassa, BH has between 10,000 to 
20,000 followers with a great range of young (7 to 30 years) including members from 
Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia and Sudan.134 
Jihad is the name given to the fight of Boko Haram against all the unbelievers 
around the world. Suranjan Weeraratne posits that Boko Haram had reached an 
astonishing level in the 2011 when it increased its numbers of attacks by diversifying its 
targets and locations from single police stations to the most prominent administrative 
buildings, undergoing a significant change in operations, as if to demonstrate its maturity 
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and devotion in the fight.135 By attacking the administrative buildings and other public 
places, Boko Haram defies the Nigerian government and demonstrates by the brutality of 
its operations how far it is willing to go. Likewise, Shekau never hesitates in his 
propaganda videos to warn the Nigerian president and sometimes Westerners of the 
group’s commitment, and to communicate his belief that the fight will hurt the unfaithful 
everywhere in the world. The intro of a video released by Boko Haram on March 17, 
2011 praised Abubakar Shekau as a hero terrifying the unbelievers around the world; in 
his speech, Shekau invited every Christian to convert to Islam, and he refer to European 
and American leaders by name, reminding them that the jihad is against them and their 
followers.136 This drastic change mainly happened following BH’s open connection to 
Al Qaeda, from which it received significant training and equipment. Thus, Jacob Zenn 
declares that after receiving significant bits of help from AQIM, Boko Haram conquered 
about 12,000 square miles in the northeastern part of Nigeria from 2013 to 2014—an area 
the size of the state of Maryland in the United States—and openly pledged allegiance to 
the Islamic State.137 To achieve its goals, Boko Haram excels in suicide bombings and 
sporadic gunmen attacks. Abassa in 2015 highlights that BH influenced not only the 
majority of the northern states of Nigeria (Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Bauchi, Yobe, and 
Kano), but also gained access to the biggest cities of Nigeria like Lagos and Abuja, when 
it was carrying out attacks, bombings and kidnappings, as well as in the bordering 
countries of Cameroon, Niger, and Chad.138  
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3. Suicide Bombing  
Suicide bombing occupied an important place in BH operations when Malam 
Abubakar Shakau became the leader of Boko Haram in 2009. He focused the fight on 
revenge against the perpetrators of the killing of his late mentor. Camolli notes that 
Shekau is more violent, never hesitating to use asymmetric methods, and always has the 
last word despite the thirty elders composing Boko Haram’s decision-making council.139 
Just after Shekau took command, the group employed a different approach more 
dominated by cruelty and the multiplication of attacks on national targets. According to 
The Guardian, Boko Haram has multiplied its efforts in a series of attacks on police 
stations, churches, and prisons in the northeastern part of Nigeria from 2009 to 2012, 
killing around 700 people and freeing 721 others from prisons.140  
To perform the killing of many people at once, Boko Haram received training and 
external support to concoct more lethal weapons, as shown in its recent suicide attacks. In 
August 26, 2011, BH attacked the United Nations compound in Abuja; the car bomb 
killed twenty-three people and injured more than seventy-five others. According to 
Walker, the attack on the UN installations in Abuja indicated that Boko Haram is 
receiving external help, as it was performed with explosives that BH has never used 
before. He continues that it is difficult to report the exact number of people wounded and 
killed by the group after the series of attacks, with suicide cars shifting to the use of girl 
suicide bombers targeting schools and churches as well as markets.141 Kriel highlights 
that the car suicide bombings became less successful after the multiplication of police 
control in public areas, leading BH to turn to girls to carry out 244 of the 388 suicide 
bombings.142 Kriel also analyses the targets of the total bombings from 2011 to 2017, 
which were directed at striking the government administration at 52 percent, and more 
                                                 
139 Comolli, 60–61. 
140 “Boko Haram Attacks? Timeline,” The Guardian, September 25, 2012, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/25/boko-haram-timeline-nigeria. 
141 Walker, “What Is Boko Haram?,” 4–6. 




than 40 percent directed at other secular and non-government targets.143 These massive 
operations have led Nigeria and its partners to fight against the group with the same 
energy as they currently employ against ISIS and Al Shabaab.  
a. Sporadic Shooting Attacks 
Also, sporadic shooting attacks are one of the illustrative strategies of BH to 
increase its domination on the population and acquire territory. According to Wilson, in 
2017, BH committed 109 attacks in Nigeria, thirty-two in Cameroon, two in Chad, and 
seven in Niger.144 Unlike other religions in which the clergy convince people by 
teaching and spreading the principles of their religion, Boko Haram’ combatants 
implement sporadic attacks to draw the attention of authorities, and persuade people to 
join them. 
According to Oladunjoye and Omemu, every aspect of life in the northern part of 
Nigeria is affected by Boko Haram’s presence, creating less interest from investors and a 
diminishing school attendance in favor of madrasas.145 The authors note an insignificant 
variance between male and female school attendance but believe that the sect is 
contributing to transforming millions of children into street beggars and creating a real 
gap of development between the north and the south, which is under the government’s 
protection.146 Moreover, Joda and Olowoselu highlight, with a list of gunmen raids and 
attacks from 2011 to 2015 on schools and education administrations that BH’s insurgency 
caused girls’ school attendance in the north of Nigeria to significantly drop.147 They 
believe that the fear of girls being killed or kidnapped, the trauma of previous attacks 
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they experienced, and the closing of many schools are the principal factors behind the 
decline in girls’ school attendance.148 
The shooting and suicide attacks strategies applied by Boko Haram enable the 
sect to control at some level most of the northern regions of Nigeria. Thus, citizens are 
obliged to deal with the group or fly to another town more secure for them, and those 
who fail to migrate will be captured by the group. Zen highlights that Boko Haram 
achieved several victories in the north of Nigeria by mostly freeing the locality from 
military presence, and Abubakar Shakau even renamed some of the conquest towns, such 
Dar al-Islam (home of Muslims) and Dar al Hikma (house of wisdom and knowledge, 
home where sciences are taught) respectively for Gwoza and Mubi and declared them 
part of the Islamic State.149 On one hand, the gunmen attacks enabled Boko Haram to 
control significant land, mainly in the north. On another hand, the attacks occasioned the 
displacement and the dispossession of many other people’s properties.  
4. Kidnapping 
In addition to suicide bombing and sporadic attacks, kidnapping is part of BH 
operations’ procedures. They are several ideas behind BH’s kidnapping, including the 
enlargement of the group and the satisfaction of the sexual needs of the combatants. On 
one hand, Abassa mentions that amongst the girls kidnapped by BH, several were forced 
to marry the combatants, while others were used as fighters or sold as slaves.150 On the 
other hand, on April 15, 2018, BBC NEWS revealed that among the 276 Chibock 
schoolgirls abducted in 2014 by BH, 112 were not released, but according to the source, 
only 15 of these 112 remain alive, leading to a serious investigation about what happened 
to the girls.151 
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Also, children constitute a great range of BH haram fighters, with many having 
been kidnapped and brainwashed. Not weighing the consequences of their membership 
and hoping for better life after their death, these children are committed to the group and 
execute any order coming from the leaders. Abassa notes that in 2014, BH abducted a 
large number of boys in the village of Madagali and Adamawa after murdering those who 
resisted.152 According to UNICEF, in 2016, about 2,000 children were fighting for BH; 
among those, several were used as suicide bombers, as in the Maiduguri market attacks, 
where the two bombers were between seven and eight years old.153 
C. FUNDING 
Whatever the size of a terrorist group, to ensure its survival, it needs financial 
means to recruit new combatants and complete its activities. Terrence McCoy highlights 
that the extreme poverty of northern Nigeria does not prevent Boko Haram from owning 
an ostensibly unlimited quantity of heavy weaponry, vehicles, bombs, and ammunition 
use to create havoc on the population. In 2009, Boko Haram became economically 
powerful by receiving support from Al Qaeda through its regional branch of AQIM and 
multiplying its fund-collecting strategies. Thus, a BH spokesman in 2011 announced that 
the organization was aligned with Al-Qaeda, which would supply every type of support 
they required.154 Clear pieces of evidence confirm that Al Qaeda supports Boko Haram 
by providing funding, building the fighters’ capacity, and logistics, as well as counsel.155 
In addition to support from affiliate terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, Boko Haram’s 
funds also come from charity and donations, hostages for ransom, and illicit trade.  
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1. Illicit Trade 
In addition to the fundraising methods already mentioned, Boko Haram has also 
engaged in many types of illicit trade, including human trafficking, drugs, and weapons. 
As with influential terrorist organization like ISIS, Hamas, FARC, Hezbollah, and the 
Taliban, illicit trade supports BH’s activities. Doubtless BH’s main income results from 
illicit trade, as indicated by its acquisitions and combatants. Khashim Shettima, Governor 
of Borno, in his speech at an official meeting, described BH’s responsibility for major 
cattle-rustling in the region.156 According to the Nigerian Central Bank, Boko Haram 
robbed 30 banks in 2011;157 Shettima believes since the Nigerian security forces’ efforts 
have prevented bank looting, BH group has gone back to the ordinary methods of stealing 
cattle to finance its activities.158 Moreover, Ahmadu Suleiman, chairman of Kaduna 
cattle breeders association, posits that there is a clear connection between cattle-rustling 
and Boko Haram, mainly in the northern regions of Nigeria, where 7,000 cattle vanished 
between 2013 and 2014, while the Governor of Katsina, Aminu Bello Massari, 
announced the recapture of more than 30,000 cattle from the rustlers since the Military 
Joint Force Task started operations against the threat of BH in 2011.159 
Besides cattle-rustling, Nigerian reports have implicated Boko Haram in weapons 
trafficking. Onuoha believes that Boko Haram is exploiting the porous borders Nigeria 
has with Benin, Chad, and Cameroon with 1,499 illegal entries to the country, as well as 
through the proliferation of arms from Libya after the fall of Khaddaffi, in order to 
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smuggle weapons into the Sahel with the complicity of AQIM and MUJWA.160 
Additionally, Camolli notes that Boko Haram is likely using women in weapons 
smuggling because they are likely to evade security searching and more likely to benefit 
from the largesse of the security forces.161 In 2012, as reported by the Financial Task 
Force, two members of Boko Haram were arrested at the Burkina Faso-Niger borders as 
they transported weapons, ammunitions, and the amount of $13,500, after which police 
investigations disclosed that the seized materials came from a Burkina Faso arms 
dealer.162 
In the broadening of its economic activities, Boko Haram’s involvement in drug 
trafficking is not negligible. Considering the notorious terrorist organizations involved in 
the triangular drug trafficking between South America, West Africa, and Europe, 
including Al Qaeda, FARC, and Hezbollah, and their affinities to BH, one can infer the 
group’s participation in this activity.163 Also, the United Nations General Secretary, Ban 
Ki-moon, in his speech on Ministerial Conference on Drug in 2015, corroborates the idea 
of BH’s implication in drug trafficking in West Africa.164 Therefore, through this 
extensive network Boko Haram has established in Africa and around the world through 
its connections with other organizations, and according to revelations from interrogations, 
the group has diverse fund-raising methods that allow it to amass millions of dollars per 
year. 
2. Hostages for Ransom 
Boko Haram is also skilled in hostage-taking, which is one of the group’s primary 
funding strategies. The kidnapping of overseas citizens conveys plentiful cash to bear the 
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group’s expenses, while the abduction of local citizens not only grants money but serves 
as a catalyst for pressure against the government. Callimachi posits that Al Qaeda and its 
direct affiliates, including Boko Haram, have acquired more than $125 million from 
ransoms since 2008.165 Additionally, from April 2013 to April 2014, Boko Haram has 
executed a series of extraordinary kidnappings, from local ordinary citizens to foreign 
personalities. The abduction of the family of Tangui Moulin Fournier, a French citizen 
working in GDF, a French gas company in Cameroon, brought Boko Haram an estimated 
$3.14 million in April 2013.166 In the same year, the kidnapping of Shettima Ali 
Monguno, the former Nigerian Minister of petroleum and chief of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), was another opportunity for Boko Haram to 
amass millions of dollars. Also, in 2014, the kidnapping of the Cameroonian Deputy 
Prime Minister’s wife and family of Kolofata’s leader resulted in the disbursement of 
$600,000 and the release of 30 Boko Haram’s militants imprisoned in Cameroon.167  
Beyond individual abduction, Boko Haram demonstrated its talent in group 
abduction, such as the abductions in Chibok in 2014.168 McCoy confirms that the 
kidnapping of 200 schoolgirls of Chibok was the most large-scale plan ever executed by 
Boko Haram.169 This portrayal of Boko Haram’s activities, as well as kidnapping for 
ransom, is sufficient to understand how far Boko Haram is willing to go in order to 
satisfy its aims. 
3. Charity/ Donations 
Charity and donations from organizations and people sharing the same religious 
ideology also play a significant part in Boko Haram’s funding. McCoy argues that Bin 
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Laden sent $3 million to BH as contribution to upgrade the activities of the group after 
the killing of BH’s charismatic leader Mohammad Yusuf in 2009.170 By financing other 
terrorist groups, Al Qaeda hoped to resurrect itself after the U.S military intervened 
against terror in the Middle East. In addition to Al Qaeda, Boko Haram is weaving a deep 
relationship with AQIM. Camolli notes that, as released in the media, Nigerian 
intelligence reported to the Nigerian president in 2012 that Boko Haram had received $40 
million from AQIM.171  
In addition to backing by specific terrorist groups, BH also receives regular 
contributions from its members. Besides the microfinance operation established by 
Mohammed Yusuf benefitting Boko Haram’s members in the 2000s, the group received a 
daily contribution of 100 Naira, or $0.80, from the majority of its thousands of 
members.172 Camolli points to the great contributions of some political figures of the 
Borno state such as Buju Foi, Mohamed Ali Ndume and Saidu Pindar, who were 
suspected of using their personal and public funds to finance Boko Haram.173 Likewise, 
Forest, in Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, presents an exhaustive 
list of people suspected of financing Boko Haram from 2010 to 2013; among those, some 
have been killed and others arrested and prisoned.174 Regarding Boko Haram’s funding, 
Weber notes that the noncombatant groups is well funded, and the U.K. Al Muntada 
Trust Fund and the Muslim community in Saudi Arabia are suspected of providing cash 
flow to the group.175 It is clear from the money-raising efforts of Boko Haram that the 
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group is well funded by people or associations sharing its ideology or state 
representatives seeking to preserve stability against retaliation in their constituency. 
D. NIGERIAN AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO BH 
Due to BH’s size and lethality, resolution of the BH crisis is a considerable 
challenge compared to any other counterinsurgency effort. Since the inception of the 
religious movement, the government of Nigeria has implemented several tactics. Even if 
the Nigerian government predominately uses a repressive method, it has also 
implemented some incentive approaches to contain the group. The main counter efforts 
of the government have focused on military efforts, as evidenced by the extrajudicial 
killing of Mohamed Yusuf. The military responses were counterproductive, as we noted 
the drastic shift in Boko Haram’ operations after the killing of its leader in 2009. The 
following sections examine the different responses of the Nigerian government and the 
contributions of the international partners to defeat Boko Haram.  
1. Nigerian Government Responses 
Given how Boko Haram has emerged and evolved, it is important to address how 
the Nigerian government and security forces are dealing with the group. Following the 
magnitude and nature of the threat, the Nigerian government has tested many methods to 
deal with BH. In addition to physical security improvement measures, noticeable reform 
in the security forces, BH triggered the creation of the office advising the president on 
terrorism matters. In general, to response to BH, the Nigerian government has 
implemented two principal methods: the hard and the soft.  
a. Hard Approaches 
The Nigerian government has quickly responded to BH by relying on the 
draconian methods of military operations. The Nigerian government since 2009 has been 
using real military methods to counter BH. One of the first strong countermeasures was 
the intervention of security forces in Bauchi in 2009. This operation was achieved by the 
capture of Mohamed Yusuf and other members and the seizure of important offensive 
materials. According to Solomon, the intervention in the Bauchi state resulted in four 
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days of insurrection of BH members against the security forces, resulting in the killing of 
700 people and thousands injured.176 The approach of the government to respond to BH 
by violence affected many innocent people who were just at the wrong place at the wrong 
moment. The government’s actions through the killing of innocent people alienated many 
people, leading them to sympathize with BH. 
Also, a consequence of the Bauchi operation was the growing insecurity not only 
in the state of Bauchi but in many other states. Wary about the escalation of insecurity all 
around the country, the government set up a new machine devoted to defusing BH. The 
Joint Task Force Operation to Restore Order (JTFORO) was created in 2011 with the aim 
of addressing the threat of BH. Agbiboa notes that the Joint Task Force, with a troop of 
8,000 people, did not succeed in their mission, although some noticeable results were 
achieved.177 He says that the ongoing operation perpetrated many human rights abuses 
and summary executions instead of conducting operations in accordance with intelligence 
collection.178 Likewise, Camolli highlights that the operations of the JTF were tarnished 
by many human rights abuses and illegal killings, thereby severely damaging the 
credibility of the operation and motivating other people to join BH.179 Following the 
numerous complaints about the JFT ORO and its ineffectiveness at addressing the BH 
scourge, it was replaced by the newly created 7th Infantry Division in August 2013. 
Finally, the military response to BH was not only an occasion to increase the 
army budget for more equipment procurement but also a unique occasion to join several 
branches of the army and police together for the same cause. In 2014, 20 percent ($5.949 
billion) of the Nigerian budget was allocated to defense.180 According to Camolli, 
inefficiency and inaccurate intelligence caused the failure of the JTF ORO, composed of 
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the Nigerian Air Force, the Army’s 21st armored brigade and the Counterterrorism unit, 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the State Security Service (SSS), and the Police 
Forces.181 In the same register, Camolli notes that following the endless but ineffective 
track of JTF on the leaders of BH, the government decided to grant a reward of 
$139,692,118 for the head of Shekau and $27, 938, 000 for those of fourteen other 
leaders of the group.182 The composition of the JTF and the considerable amount of 
money devoted to the death of BH leaders suffice to highlight the commitment of the 
Nigerian government to use all the available drastic measures to crush BH.  
Also, in addition to the listed methods, many other systematic approaches were 
taken to counter the insurgency of BH. In tandem with the police forces and the JTF, 
check points, search cordons, protection of strategic points, and armed military patrol 
have been initiated. However, comparing the engagement of Nigerian security forces and 
their relationship with intelligence, it is hard to assume a genuine collaboration between 
them. Cognizant of the role of intelligence in counterterrorism, Nigeria has a long way to 
go in defeating terrorism. 
b. The Soft Approaches 
In addition to the military responses, from time to time, the Nigerian government 
has implemented an appeasement strategy in the fight against BH to persuade the 
insurgents to stop violence, mainly when the tough approach has shown its incapacity to 
end the crisis. Among the numerous ways, the Federal government, as well as local 
administrations, have undertaken a series of negotiations and the granting of substantial 
economic incentive to the members of BH. For instance, after the killing of Mohamed 
Yusuf in the police custody in 2009, the former governor of Borno supposedly paid the 
amount of $520,000 to appease the anger of the group.183 
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Furthermore, the federal government has made many concessions to reach a 
consensus with BH, including negotiations and amnesty proposals to its members. 
Surprisingly, in 2013, after the failure of the military armada to deal with BH, the 
Nigerian government openly started dialogue with the group. Unfortunately, the dialogue 
did not reach a consensus because the conditions posed by BH were too harsh for the 
government to accept. Camolli notes that the requirements of BH in the dialogue included 
the trial of the policeman responsible for the killing of Abubakar Yusuf, the granting of 
compensation to the victims’ families, the release without trial of all the BH members 
imprisoned, and the withdrawal of the JTF in their bastion.184 Later, Shekau concluded 
that the nonfulfillment of BH’s grievances and the continuing of the JTF operations 
implies the government’s will not to negotiate.  
Once again in April 2013, the government proved its good faith to deal with BH 
by the creation of the Amnesty Commission. According to the presidential statement, the 
Commission was tasked to study the practicability of amnesty for and the disarmament 
and reinsertion of BH’s members into Nigerian society within three months.185 In 
response to the amnesty proposed by President Goodluck Jonathan, Shekau ironically 
responded in an audio statement that it is for BH to grant its pardon to the government of 
Nigeria and not the reverse because they have not committed any action deserving 
amnesty.186 Despite the inclusion of some respectable religious figures in the amnesty 
committee, Shekau once against rejected the overture made by the legal authorities. 
Always in the logic of negotiation, on May 2014, the federal government of 
Nigeria has established a committee tasked with recounting the grievances of BH and 
proposing solutions that can secure the north of the country. The tasks of the committee 
also failed because of the absence of interlocutors. Shekau released a statement saying 
that there is no negotiation between them and any representative of the Nigerian state. 
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The response of Shekau to the committee’s invitation as highlighted by Camolli denotes 
the unwillingness and categorical refusal of Shekau to negotiate with the government.187 
The general idea coming from the carrot and stick methods implemented by the 
government shows its commitment to respond to the crisis. Despite the draconian 
approaches implemented with its corollary of extrajudicial killing and human rights 
abuses, BH is ubiquitous in the country. However, the different proposals made by the 
state denotes its good faith to peacefully end the crisis while the refusal of BH to accept 
none of the government’s propositions implies its predisposition not to negotiate, which 
means it must be treated as it deserves in the long run. 
2. International Responses 
The Nigerian crisis arouses the interest not only of countries directly affected by 
its evolution, but also the attention of countries whose interests are not directly 
threatened. On the one hand, the bordering countries of Nigeria, including Cameroon, 
Niger, and Chad, to prevent their territory from being held by BH, decided to create a 
regional Joint Task Force. On the other hand, countries including the United States, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom, seized the opportunity to join because of the 
connection of BH with other international terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda.  
BH was no longer the concern of Nigeria alone when it reached an international 
dimension. BH’s expansion to neighboring countries instigated several regional and 
international approaches. One of the most significant regional achievements was the 
deployment of the Multinational Joint Force Task (MJFT) in March 2015 by the African 
Union. Composed of 10,000 troops, the MJFT is mandated to restore security in the basin 
of the Lake Chad zone affected by BH.188 According to Ray, the results of the MJFT 
were impressive because it permitted, after ten months, the recovery of all the territory 
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occupied by BH except Borno.189 Camolli points out some challenges between the 
Nigerian forces and the other countries composing the MNJFT include mistrust, lack of 
resources, deficiency in cooperation, disproportionate troop training levels between 
different countries, and public opinion of the populations facing retaliation by BH in 
response to the MNJTF’s activities.190 
However, the results of the national and regional approaches indicate the use of 
military force as an ineffective response to the BH insurgency. This approach sees BH 
only through the lens of security issues, which is the reason why hard approaches failed 
to respond to core roots of the insurgency, including the socio-political and economic 
betterment of the northern regions of Nigeria. Indeed, the military approaches are brutal 
and inappropriate for the case of BH, especially since the joint force operation has 
embraced a transnational dimension and continues to carry out the deadliest operations in 
Nigeria and bordering countries.  
a. The United States 
The several revelations of BH’s connection to international terrorist groups and 
the attack on the UN compound in Abuja, as well as the kidnapping of foreign and 
national citizens, in addition to the massive abduction the girls of Chibok, drew the 
attention of the United States. According to the Heritage Foundation, vis-à-vis the strong 
economic, military, and diplomatic relations established between the United States and 
Nigeria in the 2000s, the rise of BH was unquestionably a severe threat to the United 
States’ interests.191 For that reason, the United States has implemented some approaches 
intended to restore security in Nigeria. 
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One of the U.S initiatives against terror in Africa was the Trans-Saharan Counter-
Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The TSCTP is a joint task force program seeking to 
defeat terrorism and thwart violent extremism in West and North Africa by building 
countries’ capabilities and underpinning cooperation between West and North Africa.192 
As a mechanism, the TSCTP focuses on diplomacy, military capacity building, and 
economic development with the involvement the local governments, law enforcement, 
and justice, as well as sensitizing civilians to the danger of joining terror groups.193 To 
attain these efforts, the TSCTP relies on the State Department, including the Pentagon, 
USAID, and the Department of Justice.194 Thus, in order to test the acquisition and teach 
other strategies to the concerned army of TSCTP, an exercise called Flintlock is 
organized annually. According to Warner, Flintlock is a brilliant counterterrorism 
maneuver organized each year by the African Command (AFRICOM) with the 
participation of African, U.S, and European troops.  
In addition to military cooperation, the United States is establishing legal 
mechanisms that can stop BH’s funding. Several U.S. agencies, including the Department 
of Justice, are engaged in Nigeria to improve the level of law enforcement services. 
Warner posits that the U.S. is intervening in several domains in Nigeria in their efforts to 
cut terrorism funding. The Military Intelligence Support Team (MIST), and the National 
Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) cooperate with the police and the army to 
provide accurate information by involving the population in the collection.195 In addition 
to building military capabilities, law enforcement, and the intelligence capacity in 
Nigeria, Ray assumes that many Nigerian soldiers are sent to the U.S to receive 
counterterrorism training.196 Likewise, because of the human rights violations released 
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against the JTF ORO, U.S. Special Forces trained the 72 counterterrorism battalion of 
Nigerian in the Unites States and continuing this training via by the 3rd Special Forces 
Group.197  
On the same note, in mid-2013, because of the increase of terrorist attacks in 
Nigeria and other countries of the continent, the U.S., deeply concerned with the 
situation, decided to put a bounty on the head of Abubakar Shekau and other terrorist 
leaders in Africa. Thus, the State Department through its justice program promised the 
amount $7 million out of $23 million for information leading to the capture of Abubakar 
Shekau (BH), $5 million for Mokhtar Belmokhtar (Al-Qaeda) and Yahya Al-Hammam 
(AQIM), and $3 million for Malik Abdel Karim (AQIM) and Oumar Ould Hamaha 
(MUJAO).198 
b. The United Kingdom 
A former British colony, Nigeria has always been economically and politically 
tied to the UK, and the UK’s cooperation focuses on military technical assistance and 
advising. With about 500,000 Nigerian migrants in the U.K., the killing of Private Lee 
Rigby in August 2013 by two British Muslims of Nigerian origin drew the attention of 
UK authorities, which since then have become more concerned with the ongoing terrorist 
crisis in Nigeria even if no connections have been established between the murder and 
BH.199 
The UK, in response to the insecurity in Nigeria, signed in 2013 a five-year 
cooperation agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), on fighting 
terrorism and on maritime piracy in the Niger Delta. According to Lowe, the MOU is a 
bilateral pact between the UK and Nigeria to fight against terrorism and maritime 
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insecurity mainly in the Niger Delta where oil smuggling is a daily problem.200 
According to Olusola Obada, Minister of Nigerian Defense, the MOU is set at the right 
moment because it can help to defuse BH’s cruelty and reduce oil smuggling, which is 
causing an important economic loss to the state.201 Also on August 2018, new life was 
given to the U.K.-Nigeria cooperation by the visit of UK Prime Minister Theresa May. 
The Nigeria Economy website highlights that the latest visit of the UK prime minister to 
Nigeria was a great opportunity to reinforce the economic cooperation on the eve of 
Brexit and to set the blueprint of fructuous military cooperation for a country decimated 
by terrorism, banditry, and illegal trade.202 
Also, the UK is very present in Nigerian military training. The Staff College and 
the Army Command institutions are sponsored by the UK which provides funding and 
military facilities. Also, the UK regularly delivers training in Nigeria and hosts several 
Nigerian officers at the British Defense Academy. According to Watts, since 2015, The 
UK has trained more than 30,000 Nigerian troops on counterterrorism strategies.203 
The UK also intervenes in the social and economic field in Nigeria. Believing that 
too many military responses have been implemented, the UK is proposing that the 
Nigerian government develop approaches responding to the social and economic 
aspirations of the citizens. According to Camolli, the British Defense Advisory Team 
(BDAT) is established in Nigeria for the technological and organizational betterment of 
the army to manage not only peacekeeping but also to deliver their daily tasks 
blamelessly.204 Camolli also mentions that the Nigerian government has neglected the 
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social and economic branches of counterinsurgency and that the Nigerian security forces’ 
abuses of the population led the British to emphasize the carrot rather than stick.205 
c. Canada 
Canada began its actions in Nigeria by designating BH as a terrorist organization 
in December 2013. According to Steven Blaney, British Ministry of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness, listing BH among international terrorist groups will help to 
fight against its members and supporters, and to interrupt its funding.206 The Canadian 
response to BH targets the humanitarian approaches and the consolidation of Nigerian 
security forces’ capabilities. 
Because Nigeria is experiencing one of the hardest times of its existence, 
regarding the secular partnership between Nigeria and Canada, the latter is evolving in 
the humanitarian sector to reduce the pain of the population affected by the BH. As Boko 
Haram has occasioned the displacement of thousands of people from the northern region 
of Nigeria, Canada’s involvement in supplying shelters and food is determinant. 
According to the High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, Canadian development and 
assistance in Nigeria reached the amount of $110 million during 2016–17, with a 
supplementary sum of $27 million devoted to humanitarian projects in 2018.207 
Similarly, in 2017 Canada hosted 10,000 Nigerian students as another way to frame the 
future with people bright enough to find an answer to the situation plaguing Nigeria.208 
In strengthening the security forces’ capability, the designation of BH as an 
international terrorist group was followed by several measures to help Nigeria in the fight 
against terror. The Canadian Minister of International Development, during a visit to 
Lagos, expressed his country’s readiness to accompany Nigeria in the fight against 
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terrorism.209Also it is important to note the significant involvement of Canada in the 
capacity building of the Sahel countries in counterterrorism efforts. According to the 
High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, the Canadian support of peace and security not 
only in Nigeria is perceptible through the Global Partnership Program (GPP) and the 
Counter-Terrorism Capability Building.210 The former program focuses on biosecurity to 
counter BH in the use of weapons of massive destruction, and the latter targets law 
enforcement efforts in investigations, border security, and deterrence of violence in 
Nigeria.211 
d. United Nations  
The UN has not stayed away from the events in Nigeria; it is taking important 
measures to support the country in its fight against terrorism. According to BH, the UN is 
a global oppressor of Muslim devotees, and its proponents posits that as long as Nigeria 
continues to work with the UN against terrorism, they will fight against the 
unbelievers.212 The spectacular abduction of the Chibok girls was followed by the 
addition of BH to the list of terrorist organizations facing UN financial sanctions and 
arms bans as defined by the first paragraph of UN Security Council Resolution 2083 of 
December 2012.213  
The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), 
established in 2005, has been engaged in Nigeria as BH’s cruelty increased from day to 
day. The CTITF in Nigeria works with three branches.214 The Integrated Assistance for 
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Counter-Terrorism (I-ACT) supports the Nigerian government by addressing the specific 
needs of the country in countering terrorism, but also by promoting the UN global 
counterterrorism approaches with the implication of UNESCO responding to some root 
causes of the phenomenon and Interpol focusing on teamwork.215 According to Alao et 
al., the lack of interagency cooperation resulting from rivalry among Nigerian forces is 
detrimental to the country’s stability, and should be addressed by severe measures against 
elements hampering the process with oversight on all the parties.216  
Also, the UN Security Council since 2014 has clearly condemned extremist 
violence and requested all its members to disable any activities leading to the perpetration 
of terrorist activities in their own country, as well as foreign countries.217 Thus, the UN 
Counter Terrorism Committee with other partners is working along with Nigeria and 
neighboring countries to repeal terrorism. In the light of the conference held on April 13 
to 15, 2018, in Ndjamena, Chad, the UN Counter Terrorism-Committee Executive 
Directorate (CTED) along with UNODC, UNDP, and IOM, the African Union (AU) and 
the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) gathered to come up with regional approaches 
against BH and its affiliates. Additionally, the participation of the Nigerian delegation led 
by Admiral Yamunu Musa to the UN High-level Conference on Terrorism in New York, 
June 28–9, 2018, followed by the visit of Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General 
of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), with other 
counterterrorism experts in Nigeria one month later, denote the engagement of the UN to 
assist Nigerian efforts in defeating BH. 
The international approaches against BH in Nigeria have not yet met its goal of 
the eradication of the group. Despite the efforts of CTITF, MOU, TSCTP, and MJFT, BH 
is still looming to threaten the stability of Nigeria and the Sahel region. Instead of 
producing positive effects, the recognition of BH as international terrorist organization 
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was a sort of publicity for the group seeking international recognition, and the sanctions 
and embargo seem to produce fewer effects on the operability of the group. The situation 
in Nigeria, therefore, appears to be headed in the same direction as that of Mali. The 
counterterrorism approaches, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts have not yet 
reached their goal of the eradication of terrorism and the establishment of peace and 
security in both Mali and Nigeria. According to The Washington Post, with the 
engagement of thousands of blue helmets, it is now one of the deadliest peacekeeping 
mission in the history of the organization.218 
E. CONCLUSION  
BH as a security threat in late 2000 drew the attention of the national government 
and international countries. Nigerian counterterrorism measures in 2009 led to the killing 
of Mohamed Yusuf, resulting in a severe transformation in the group. Moreover, the U.S. 
designation of BH as an international terrorist group on November 2013 and the new 
dispositions undertaken by the UK against terrorism have fueled the hatred of the sect 
against national and international targets. Thus, BH has become more organized and 
equipped for its destructive efforts toward Nigeria, West Africa, as well as Western 
countries.  
BH is funded by criminal activities. In addition to providing severe measures 
against global terrorism funding, as seen in the UN Resolution 2178 (2014), 2349 (2017), 
and 2396 (2017), every country should be committed to implementing the laws and 
conventions for global effect. In addition, BH must be treated as a global threat because 
isolated efforts to some extent may slow down the scourge but cannot stop it. The fight 
against BH necessitates a blend of efforts not only militarily but also economically and 
politically. As long as terrorist groups have sympathizers, its eradication will be tricky. 
New approaches should be implemented to divert terrorist groups’ followers by offering 
economic and political incentives that respond to their aspirations, because addressing the 
political and economic causes of insurgency is the starting point to defeating it. 
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IV. ASSESSING COUNTER INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM IN 
MALI AND NIGERIA  
This chapter assesses the success and failure of the approaches employed in Mali 
and Nigeria to countering insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime. It breaks these 
efforts down into three main categories: the first section studies the strength and 
weakness of military approaches by examining the efforts of the Malian security forces, 
the Serval/Barkhane operations, and MINUSMA, as well as the MNJTF and LCBC in 
Nigeria. The second section analyses the political solutions to the crisis through Malian 
peace agreements and the dialogue and amnesty committees of the Nigerian government 
by comparing the previous and current security contexts, assessing success and failure. 
The third section concerns the economic responses to the crisis applied in both the Malian 
and Nigerian cases; this section details the positive outcomes of these responses and the 
impediment of the economic efforts to alleviate the crisis. In Mali, the responses to the 
crisis registered some noticeable political and economic successes although they failed to 
reach a definite peace. Nigeria focused mainly on the military responses, resulting in 
short term success and the escalation of BH’s activities. Overall, the analysis 
demonstrates that good governance can shape and facilitate the attainment of 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism objectives.  
A. MILITARY RESPONSE 
Mali and Nigeria both resorted to a military response to insurgency. Military 
responses in Mali have been effective insofar as they replied at a critical period to the 
coalition of insurgent and terrorist groups in their ambition of creating an independent or 
Islamic state in Mali. In Nigeria, the military responses achieved short-term success by 
weakening BH operational capabilities. While military responses in military operations in 
Mali and Nigeria interrupted the terrorists’ momentum at the operational level, however, 
they have not accomplished the ultimate goal of defusing terrorism and the establishing 
of peace and security in either country. By this measure, the military responses in Mali 
and Nigeria have not been successful, as they have led to the escalation of violence, as 
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well as the strengthening of the remaining groups and the creation of others, which 
threaten stability and fight back against the military response. 
1. Advantages of Military Responses 
Operation Serval, the 2013 military intervention in Mali by international partners 
was a success, as it occurred when the existence of the state was endangered and helped 
wrest the occupied territories from the jihadist groups. Taking advantage of the pre-
deployed troops in Africa and good intelligence, Serval in coordination with AFISMA 
conducted a successful operation. The air attacks blocked the Jihadist columns while the 
ground forces secured the critical sites and defused the terrorists in their stampede. 
Bratton also praises the military operation, which eased the return of 200,000 Malians 
from the refugee camps of Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger, while families across the 
South hosted another 350,000 displaced compatriots.219 
Serval provided a glimmer of hope to the Malians, who regained confidence in the 
return of peace and security and started to settle into the mechanisms and modalities of 
the intra-Malian peace process. In Mali, the Serval operation burnished the image of the 
security forces tarnished by the defeats at Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. The operation 
reduced the maneuver of the insurgent groups and facilitated the return of this 
administration and the end of that executions and human right abuses. Serval also saved 
many lives. Boeke and Schuurman argue that Operation Serval was successful because it 
cleared the regions from terrorists and destructive weapons.220 Likewise, Maj. General 
Olivier Tramond and Lt. Col. Philippe Seigneur argue that the coordination between air 
and ground forces was the secret of Serval’s success.221  
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In Nigeria, the ultimate military success against BH traces back to the first months 
of the JTF in 2009. This operation, conducted by a multi-disciplinary team, inflicted a 
severe loss on the BH, including the arrest and killing of several combatants. The joint 
force also foiled terrorist attacks at their inception, as evidenced by the number of 
explosive preparation materials seized in the house of the groups’ leaders. Elkaim writes 
that, following the death of Mohamed Yusuf and the killing and imprisonment of several 
financial backers by the joint force operations in 2009, many people believed that BH 
could not survive.222 Also, Onapajo argues that Buhari administration’s strategy against 
BH emphasized military cooperation and the restructuration of the local military.223 He 
highlights the positive results of this approach since 2015 through the MNJTF, LCBC 
and the multiple consultations the president has undertaken to engage the world powers’ 
military to support him against BH.224 
According to Onuoha, from July 16, 2012, to August 4, 2013, the military Joint 
Task Force captured heavy weapons from BH. The seizure included twelve AK47 rifles 
and thirty magazines, two G3 rifles and 10×4 40mm bombs, three RPG tubes, and 85 
rounds of special ammunition, including eight RPGs, 10 rocket bombs, 10 rocket 
chargers, one G-3 rifle and magazine, five RPG, three FMC magazine, fourteen IEDs and 
several rounds of ammunition.225 The seizure of such an arsenal decreased significantly 
the destructive power of BH. Likewise, Hathorn and Abbott highlight the complexity of 
the war against BH by referring to its military weapons acquisition and proposed the 
reduction of that weapons supply as part of the solution.226  
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2. Inadequacy of Military Responses 
In Mali, in the longer term, the military response created numerous security 
problems. The ultimate result of the French military intervention was the multiplication 
and geographical expansion of terrorist attacks. According to Wing, France’s military 
operation in the north of Mali was followed by terrorist attacks in the center of the 
country targeting French expatriates, hence the terrorists’ choice of the Radisson Blu in 
Bamako and hotel Byblos in Sevare.227 In addition, the escalation of violence resulting 
from the military response through successive terrorist attacks against MINUSMA and 
the destruction of G5 Sahel HQ in Mopti exemplify the coalition between the terrorist 
groups and their hate for the military response of the crisis. 
Another consequence of the military operation in Mali was the creation of new 
insurgent and terrorist groups—some that wanted to take advantage of the peace 
agreement, others that aimed to continue the jihadist fight of the defused groups. In a 
prelude to the peace agreement after the military operation of 2013, several movements 
emerged in the north of Mali. According to Boutellis and Zahar, the defeat of the terrorist 
groups in north of Mali in 2013 led to the formation of new groups or associations. In this 
regard, the Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), the Arab Movement of Azawad 
(MAA) and the self-defense militia the Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces 
of the Resistance (CMFPR) were shaped according to ethnicity and grievances and 
included in the peace process.228 In addition, the Front for the Liberation of Macina 
(FLM) emerged in Mali after the rout of the major terrorist groups in 2013. Amadou 
Kouffa created the FLM, mainly composed of the Fulani people and those who were 
religiously oriented; the group is considered as the takeover of the defeated terrorist 
groups and constitutes one of the most significant security threats the country is facing 
today. According to Wing, the FLM’s goals include the rebuilding of the empire of 
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Macina in the region of Segou, and it has a strong connection with Ansar Dine.229 Since 
2015, the FLM along with the remaining forces of MUJAO has participated in several 
terrorist attacks including that against the Radisson Blu in Bamako and Byblos in 
Mopti.230 Finally, the related direct consequence of the military responses is the 
restructuration of the terrorist groups, which combined their efforts in a coalition to 
respond to the state and its partners. According to Weiss, the creation of Jamaat Nusrat 
al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) on March 2, 2017, was a regrouping of Ansar Dine, 
AQIM, Al Mourabitoun, and FLM in one single denomination and leadership, therefore 
constituting a severe menace for the stability of West Africa.231 
A final problem with the military response in Mali is that it has often taken the 
form of proxy wars, and the loss of control of the surrogate forces creates more security 
issues. In the rebellion of 1991 and 1996 Ganda Koy and Ganda Izo,232 auto defense 
organizations were used by the government against Tuareg rebels. On August 14, 2014, 
the Self Defense Group of Imgad Tuareg and allies was created (GATIA). This group 
also has the support of the Malian government to fight the insurgency.233 According to 
Andreas Krieg, the substitution of military interventions by surrogate or proxy war to 
ensure “deniability, legitimacy, urgency, cost, and capability” has shown little positive 
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outcomes in practice.234 The backing groups, because of the deficiency of control and 
oversight of the patrons, can not only undermine the stability of a situation by deviating 
from the assigned objectives, but also threaten the long-term interests of the supporters by 
following their own agenda. Even if it is hard to link state support to traditional hunters 
against the Fulani, the ongoing situation in the region of Mopti, resulting in the massacre 
of more than 130 people in the village of Ogossagou, reveals how dangerous a proxy war 
is.235 In the same vein, the extraordinary council of ministers of March 24, 2019, 
dissolved the traditional Dogon hunters’ Association (Dan Nan Ambassagou), and was 
followed by the replacement of the general chief of staff of the army, the air force chief 
of staff of and army.236 
Such failure of the military counterinsurgency response occasioned the five peace 
agreements between the insurgents and the government from 1991 to 2015. At each of 
the peace agreements, both government and insurgents noted the failure of military 
responses but did not hesitate to resort to arms when other approaches failed. 
Military responses have been both inadequate and excessive in the case of 
Nigeria; the local and international counterinsurgency methods also led to the 
radicalization of BH in Nigeria and the spread of violence across its borders. The killing 
of innocent people and abuses of the population likely contributed to change the mind of 
some people to adhere to the ideology of BH, from which they believe they will receive 
more safety and favor. Healy argues that the military responses to terrorism in Africa 
always worsen the situation.237 She believes that the military crackdown on BH in 2009 
resulted in a sequence of uncontrolled and inhuman acts from the security forces against 
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citizens so that the elders of Maiduguri pleaded with the president to withdraw the JTF, 
which they believed to have killed more of their people than BH.238 Likewise, Pérouse 
de Montclos claims that concordant sources in Nigeria revealed that the Nigerian army 
and police committed numerous atrocities and violation of human rights.239 For instance, 
20,000 people were imprisoned based on suspicions of their support to BH in 2014, and 
the security forces killed 16,133 others from June 2006 and March 2016.240 Thus, a 
range of BH combatants join or are recruited in response to those people who are 
martyrized and deceived by the Nigerian military and security forces, both of which are 
considered more aggressive than BH.  
Adibe highlights that the hard power used against BH led to the escalation of the 
groups’ violence despite the government’s praises of its own success.241 Comparing the 
result of the hard power and the list of BH’s victims, the outcome is far from being 
positive.242 Adibe indicates that from 2010 to 2015, the group has killed an estimated 
15,000 to one million people and displaced another 3.3 million.243 
B. POLITICAL RESPONSE 
In addition to military responses, both Mali and Nigeria have also included 
political responses in their counterinsurgency measure. The political approaches 
produced significant results in Mali, which negotiated with insurgents and accepted 
significant concessions for peace and stability in the country. In Nigeria, the government 
and BH failed to reach an agreement of cease-fire as a prerequisite to negotiation.  
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1. Advantage of Political Responses  
Since the second rebellion in Mali, the government and its partners to stem the 
cyclic rebellion in the north of Mali have undertaken several political measures. The 
peace agreement of 1991, 1992, 2014, and 2015 contain a series of political measures the 
government has applied to meet the threat. In the same vein, the Nigerian government, 
seeking the political ending of the crisis, concocted several political measures since the 
rise of BH. The measures comprised of negotiation with BH and an amnesty proposition 
to its members. In general, these political responses have resulted in the settlement of the 
major Tuareg insurgency in Mali through peace agreements, while Nigeria failed to 
conduct negotiations with BH. 
One virtue of political responses in the case of Mali has been peace agreements. 
The failure of the military solutions and the counterinsurgency methods applied during 
decades by the dictatorship regime of Moussa Traore led in 1991 to a new approach 
blending political, economic, and military efforts. In 1992, the government of Mali 
started to implement political solutions to face the Tuareg rebellion. The first peace 
agreement between the Tuareg belligerents and the government of Mali was called the 
National pact. Article 1 and 2 of the Decree N/ 92–121/P-CTSP/ of April 11, 1992 
dedicated a particular status to the regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal (6, 7, and 8th 
regions) of Mali, called Azawad by the insurgents, to symbolize the end of hostilities, and 
provided for the settlement of any questions resulting from the conflict.244 The treaty 
also solved a crucial employment concern of the Tuaregs as it granted the reintegration of 
insurgents into the army, police, and custom services.245 The integration of rebels in 
army and the para-military forces was not only a quick response to the crisis, but also 
provided personnel for the security of the territory.  
Another benefit of the political responses of the crisis of the north of Mali has 
been the decentralization of administration, which partially answered the Tuaregs’ 
representation concern. The special status granted to the northern regions enabled the 
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residents to decide the fate of their regions by empowering local representatives and 
increasing the number of their seats in the parliament. The third title of the Decree N/ 92–
121/P-CTSP/ April 11, 1992, on the particular status of the northern regions defines the 
organization, functioning, and the competences of the local, regional and inter-regional 
assemblies, stressing the power transfer to the local elites in affairs’ management.246 
Finally, the political approach implemented diplomatic tools in the management 
of the Malian crisis. ECOWAS played a tremendous role in the return of Mali to 
normalcy and paved the way for inter-Malian negotiation. After the series of 
condemnation of the military coup, ECOWAS under the direction of AU quickly stood 
for the return of peace and security in Mali. Pressuring the junta to pass the power to the 
president of the National Assembly, its efforts resulted in the organization of a 
presidential election and the starting of the Algiers peace agreement process. Boutellis 
and Zahar highlight the participation of ECOWAS through its emissaries from Bamako 
and Ouagadougou to Algiers between the government of Bamako and the insurgents 
through the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement of 2013, and the final Algiers 
Agreement of 2015.247 In the same vein Lecocq et al., praise the straightforward stance 
of ECOWAS to coerce the junta to transfer the power to civilians and its diplomatic 
efforts, which facilitated the resolution of the crisis through the president of Cote d’Ivoire 
and Burkina Faso.248 
In Nigeria, although the government attempted political approaches to respond to 
the crisis of BH, it did not succeed in negotiating with BH. The failure of the military 
response to defuse BH has led the Nigerian government from 2013 to consider political 
response by negotiation. After the debacle of the JFT’s operations, the Nigerian 
government accepted negotiations with BH. This approach could have reached a positive 
outcome if BH had not posed hardline conditions to the government. The resolution of 
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many conflicts starts with the negotiation process, as noted in the case of Mali, and BH 
was unlikely ready to negotiate with the government. On one hand, the conditions posed 
by BH for the dialogue were hard enough for the Nigerian state, as it included the trial of 
the police officers and military making up the JTF, the release without trial of BH 
members, as well as financial compensation to the families of victims, and the 
withdrawal of the JTF from the region.249 On the other hand, the government’s 
disrespectful refusal to stop the military operations finally ended the opportunity to reach 
a political solution. 
The Nigerian government also proposed amnesty of BH members as part of the 
solution. Despite the perpetration of cruelty and the number of BH victims, the federal 
government of Nigeria has decided to grant amnesty to its members in its way of finding 
a tangible solution to the crisis. On April 23, 2014, President Goodluck Jonathan installed 
the Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the north 
of Nigeria. This commission was tasked to study the conditions of the amnesty, the 
disarmament and the reinsertion of BH members. However, this commission failed by the 
manifest refusal of BH to adhere to the idea. Shekau argues that BH has no reason to 
accept the pardon of the Nigerian state because his group is the victim of the government 
and that the amnesty should come from BH to the unfaithful Nigerian institutions.250 
Finally, in May 2014, the Nigerian government established another committee tasked 
with inventorying BH’s grievances and proposing durable solutions. As the previous 
attempt to find political solutions to the crisis, the later approaches consisted of 
negotiation between the government and BH represented by Sheikh Abdul Azeez Ibn 
Adam to register the grievances and to come up with solutions. After a public release of 
information about BH readiness to accept a cease fire and negotiate the conditions to the 
peaceful resolution of the crisis, Shekau appeared on video to deny all the allegations, 
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firmly maintaining that Abdul Azeez had never been appointed by BH; as a consequence, 
there is no dialogue between his group and the government.251  
2 Inadequacy of Political Responses 
In Mali, the political approaches in responding to the crisis has created a severe 
security challenge, and the proliferation of groups on the eve of the peace agreement 
complicated the situation. In the Nigerian case, the political responses by the government 
and partners implemented to deal with BH inadvertently worked as publicity for the 
group as it sought international recognition. 
The integration of insurgents in the army is one of the inadequacies of the 
political response to the Malian crisis, as the trained soldiers often join the insurgents 
against the state of Mali. The seventh point of the third title of the Decree N/ 92–121/P-
CTSP/ April 11, 1992 requested the effective integration of all the fighters of Movements 
and Fronts Unified Azawad (MFUA) in the different corps of Mali.252 According to 
Peace Accord Matrix, from 1992 to 1996 about 2,800 Tuareg combatants integrated into 
Malian’s army units.253 The former rebels integrated into the army and trained to be 
consequential support for security—until they betrayed the nation at the first opportunity 
by attacking its institutions. It is likely that a large portion of the integrated and 
reintegrated military from the Tuareg combatant groups took part in the latest rebellions. 
Instead of learning lessons from the past, the government of Mali is still implementing 
the same approach as stipulated by the current Algiers peace agreement. The 2012 army 
deserters reintegrated into the army with a financial advantage, a situation that fuels the 
indignation of other ethnic groups.  
Another flaw of the political response to the Tuareg rebellion in Mali was the 
reduction of military presence in the north, which severely weakened Mali’s control over 
the region. One of the clauses of the peace agreement of 1992 required the reduction of 
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military presence in the strategic towns of the north.254 The implementation of the 
protocol of 1992 led to a drastic diminution of the military presence, resulting in the 
transformation of some barracks to schools and recreational centers. Knowing the 
immensity and the security challenges from the region, the progressive military 
withdrawal facilitated the settlement of terrorist organizations and organized criminals. 
The first took advantage of the state’s absence to consolidate its relationship with the 
population and spread extremist ideology across the region. The second, increased from 
1990 to 2000 with the type of traffickers resorting to military weapons to transport 
merchandise.255  
Moreover, in 2014, the political approach to the crisis occasioned the proliferation 
of associations and groups seeking to take advantage of the negotiation, which 
complicated the negotiation process. Apart from the terrorist groups, the principal 
participants in the 2012 crisis were MNLA and Ansar Dine. Since the opening of the first 
round of negotiation between the government of Mali and the insurgents, additional 
groups emerged in the north, demanding their inclusion in the peace process. Boutellis 
and Zahar argue that the increase in the number of the participants in the negotiation 
thwarts the process, which extended to five rounds and was tainted by a series clashes 
between groups.256 They highlight that the preliminary peace agreement of 
Ouagadougou registered only two armed groups: MNLA and the High Council for the 
Unity of Azawad (HCUA) created in 2013 from a splinter of Ansar Dine, while the 
Algiers peace agreement included the participation of a few other groups regrouped under 
the coordination of Azawad and the Platform.257 
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Lastly, the exclusion of the terrorist groups—Ansar Dine, AQIM, MUJAO—from 
the peace process of 2013–2015 led to an increase in terrorist attacks not only in the 
northern regions, but also in the center of Mali. This political mistake is still undermining 
the security of Mali. Such recent events as the attack on the military barrack of Dioura in 
the region of Segou and the massacre in the village of Ogossagou in the region of Mopti 
demonstrates the terrorist group’s persistence in Mali.258 
In Nigeria, the political stance of the government and its international partners 
against BH in the 2000s has contributed to the internationalization of the group by 
increasing its operability capabilities across Africa.259 The recognition of BH as an 
international terrorist organization by the United States, the UN, and Canada, followed by 
the sanctions of the UN against its members and their belongings produced the opposite 
effect expected. Long ignored by the great powers, the act of the U.S. mainly comforted 
BH, which henceforth considered itself as an international threat. Salifu discusses that the 
blacklisting of BH as an Al-Qaeda affiliate and the following measures taken by the UN 
Security Council did not affect the group. On the contrary, UN measures granted BH 
international recognition, leading to cooperation with other organizations, such as AQIM, 
and the strengthening of its capabilities to carry out more lethal operations against 
strategic symbols, including schools, markets and administrative buildings.260 Shekau 
even described the UN, the United States and the Nigerian government as unfaithful and 
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sustained that BH will continue to react as long as the coalition of unbelievers will 
continue to work for its elimination.261 
In addition, the failure of negotiation between BH and Nigerian officials by 
refusing BH’s conditions exposed the country and its neighbors to multiples terrorist 
activities. In the beginning, Bohari’s government was likely ready to fulfill the majority 
of BH grievance sine qua non for the negotiations.262 The shift of the situation in late 
2013 by the Nigerian players, promising negotiation and at the same time crushing the 
group, created a situation of severe mistrust for BH of the government. The promises of 
negotiation paired with the continued military operation led to BH declining all types of 
dialogue with the government.263 In sum, the failure of the political approach in Nigeria 
encouraged BH to diversify and intensify their terrorist attacks in Nigeria and beyond as 
one way to confirm its international terrorist status. According to Felter, from 2011, BH 
has been responsible of the death of about 37,000 people.264 Knowing that the best 
solution of this case would be to pass through negotiation, the Nigerian government 
played the wrong card by failing to agree with BH. To date, the lethal force of BH 
remains despite the government’s supposed reconquering of its territories and the 
Nigerian forces’ victory. 
C. ECONOMIC RESPONSE 
Mali has also implemented economic measures in the resolution of the cyclic 
Tuareg insurgency. The economic responses not only provide mechanisms for the 
development of the Northern regions, as well as individual wealth, but also caused the 
diversion of a significant amount of money for personal interests and the realization of 
poor quality infrastructure. Nigeria, by contrast, has not been able to implement any 
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sustained economic approaches, primarily because of the failures in the political 
response. 
1. Advantages of Economic Responses 
The economic measures contained in the peace agreements between the 
government of Mali and the insurgents contributed to the development of the northern 
regions and the social reinsertion of many combatants. Among these economic measures, 
the special development provision for the northern regions and the allocation of funds to 
insurgents to start small business were the main thrusts.  
In the peace agreement of 1991, Title III on the role and missions of the local and 
regional assembly, granted an important place to the economic, social, and cultural 
development of the north.265 The failure of the integral implementation of the 1991 
peace agreement led to the rebellion and the peace agreement of 1996, which mainly 
focused on the economic development of the region of Kidal.266 As in the previous peace 
agreements, in the latest peace agreement of June 2015, a particular emphasis was on the 
development of the northern region to solve its economic difficulties. According to 
Boubou Cissé, former Minister of Economy and Finance, Mali is planning to spend €3.35 
billion for the development of the northern regions; this project is meant to improve 
global governance and social development, including access to basic social services, the 
economic development and infrastructures.267 According to Pezard and Shurkin, to attain 
peace in the north of Mali, the government has engaged in serious economic development 
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projects aimed to fill the economic gap between the south and the north, which is 
disfavored by the difficult climatic situation.268  
Although the peace agreements did not resolve the Tuareg insurgency, the 
economic approaches still have some positive effects. For one, the peace agreements of 
the 1990s enabled the government to balance the economic disparity between the south 
and the north, which not only created job opportunities, but also enabled the northern 
regional assembly to decide what was good for the development of the regions.269 The 
implementation of subsequent economic efforts in the north of Mali resulted in a peaceful 
period between 1991 and 2012, which allowed the government to implement the clauses 
of the agreement from which both parties took advantage. If the insurgents benefited 
from the financial outcomes of the peace agreements, the government has enjoyed the 
peacetime and boosted its reputation as a site of good democracy in the international 
realm. According to Freedom House, the democratic alternation of power and the 
political rights and civil liberty in Mali in 2011 positioned the country among the good 
examples of democratic and free countries of Africa.270  
The economic response in the Malian crisis also provided a special development 
program and special tax waiver for the Northern regions, which incentivized third parties 
to further various government projects. The promise of these projects had short-term 
effects on reducing violence in the northern regions. The National Pact of 1991 
recommended that the Malian government not only to provides necessary funds for 
development projects managed by regional assemblies, but also suggested the provision 
of inducements to local and international investors. This approach generated new 
opportunities to the local inhabitants and provided basic necessary structures crucial for 
their daily life. The Supporting Project for Local Development (PADL) co-funded by 
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Mali and partners, which was operating in fifteen communes of the Ansongo, Gao, and 
Bourem, realized from 1997 to 2004, included around 937 projects in education, 
agriculture, tourism, fish farming, water supply, livestock, health, and silting for a total 
amount of $3,986,463.271 The regional and local development tax in the northern regions 
of Mali is currently less than $2 per adult, with exemption for women with three children, 
the elderly, students, the sick and the disabled.272  
As a result, cognizant of the wealth behind these national efforts, a few groups in 
the north decided to defend their interests by standing alongside the government and 
refused to continue their association with rebel group. Pezard and Shurkin argue that 
1,900 insurgents benefited from the government financial support to start small 
businesses.273 Boilley argues that the Support Program for the Socio-economic 
Reintegration of Ex-combatants (PAREM) in collaboration with PNUD distributed the 
amount of $5,093,378 to individuals to start new business, and the CAR-Nord program 
granted $314,091 to groups or associations for their reinsertion after the peace agreement 
of 1996.274  
The government of Nigeria, by contrast, barely implemented economic 
approaches to deal with the case of BH. According to the several attempts of Nigeria 
officials helped by influential political and religious leaders, they failed to conduct 
negotiations between BH and the government.275 The counterinsurgency methods based 
on military operations the government and its partners adopted since the launch of BH 
curtailed all opportunity of dialogue between the parties, nullifying the implementation of 
economic responses. At most, some isolated cases of Nigerian officials bribing BH in 
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exchange for their regions’ safety from attacks have been reported.276 In contrast to Mali, 
however, the Nigerian government has implemented efforts countering the financing of 
terrorism, which significantly dropped the amount of cattle rustling and bank robbery,277 
and the Terrorism Act of 2011 made the task of the law enforcement easier, with clear 
definitions of terrorism infringements and the perpetrators’ punishment.278  
2. Inadequacy of Economic Responses  
Since 1991, the Malian government has been investing enormous amount of 
money in the development of the northern regions, but comparing the spending and the 
result on the field, several negative results are noticeable. The economic responses have 
registered only short-term results due to the insecurity of the regions, the diversion of the 
fund and the execution of the development projects by unqualified and underequipped 
enterprises realizing poor quality of infrastructures.  
One shortcoming in Mali is that economic measures were implemented in an 
insecure environment, which further led to the destruction of the acquisitions. As opposed 
to the south, where projects such school construction, irrigation, livestock, gardening, and 
small business can last forever; the insecure environment of the north has led to the 
everlasting reconstruction of the region.279 This state of affairs very likely not only to 
discourage local investors from commencing new activities, but also threatens to prevent 
international businessmen from risking their money and life in uncertain affairs. The 
absence of foreign investment in the northern regions of Mali makes the task of the 
government more complicated to develop the vast desert regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and 
Kidal. Gaëlle Le Roux in 2011 argues that Ansar Dine forbids the presence of NGOs in 
the north of the country where the population crucially need aid after the damage of 
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harvests and food stocks, the destruction and looting of banks, schools, hospitals and 
businesses, and the absence of running water and electricity in some areas.280 Likewise, 
in the 2012 crisis in Mali more than 200 educational facilities have been destroyed, 
occupied or looted by armed groups.281 Fatoumata Maiga also posits that in 2012, armed 
groups in the north of Mali committed the destruction of social infrastructure including 
schools, health centers, and women’s cooperatives.282  
The second inadequacy in Mali’s economic responses has been the diversion of 
funds. With the weak state presence in the north, and the empowerment of the local 
authorities, resources dedicated to the development of the region have been diverted. 
These circumstances suggest that not only does the state have weak control over the 
persons in charge of the execution of the projects, but also on those responsible for 
supervising their execution. Title III of the Peace Agreement of 1996 mentions that while 
the state provides funds for the development of the northern regions, the execution and 
supervision of the projects is the responsibility of the regional assembly.283 Caramel 
notes that since 2012, Mali has received more than $1 billion in international aid a year 
for a poorly visible result in the field, mainly regarding the northern crisis, which is 
spreading toward the south, and officials are unable to provide satisfactory answers on 
the use of resources.284 The most striking example is the diversion of the funds for the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants after the 1990 rebellion 
by the Tuareg Ifoghas to obtain the loyalty of the population and consolidate their power 
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on their rivals Tuareg Imghad.285 In the same manner, the eruption of a new rebellion 
disrupts the continuation of ongoing development activities, which is a good opportunity 
for its executors to misuse the remaining fund and materials on the pretext that attacks on 
the office have sabotaged the projects.  
The one other flaw of the economic response in the Malian crisis concerns the 
quality of the enterprises engaged in the reconstruction of the region to execute poor 
quality works. The promotion of local enterprises could be more profitable for the 
community if the projects executed could last for a while. Unfortunately, due to the local 
development contract between the state and the regions, large parts of the contracts on 
building infrastructures and roads are carried out by local businesses.286 Demante 
confirms that the realization of investments by local companies in order to promote 
regional economic growth has some consequences in the quality of the work offered by 
companies insufficiently trained and equipped. She maintains that in the case of projects 
financed by PADSL, the executed works were of average quality and 25 percent of them 
would roughly require major repairs.287 As a result, since the 1990s, Mali has been 
playing a ping-pong game of construction and reconstruction of the north. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The study of the implemented responses to the secular Tuareg crisis in Mali and 
the BH crisis in Nigeria provide important positive results and negative effects of the 
military, political, and economic approaches. To some extent, counterinsurgency is 
necessary depending on the nature of the nature and the size of group, as well as it 
connection to the population. However, the overuse of the military solution can easily 
shift the insurgent group to undertake new objectives through the escalation of violence 
and radicalization. Hard counterinsurgency methods lead to the commission of numerous 
human rights violations and the killing of innocent people, therefore increasing the rank 
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of insurgents. In addition, the political approach has shown important benefits as it allows 
the parties to open a dialogue and agree on potential responses to the crisis and its 
implementation modalities. On the other hand, the nonfulfillment of the political promise 
often compromises the entire peace process, while ceding too much can make it difficult 
to retain control of a region and to make good on promises to the population. Finally, 
economic distress and the lack of opportunity triggers the majority of the crisis, which 
require effective responses in the peace processes. Based on this analysis, the case studies 
of Mali and Nigeria reveal that responding to insurgency require the blend of military, 
political and economic approaches because focusing too much on one method will be 
ineffective and can give rise to other problems.  
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This study reveals that the crisis in Mali has several military, political, and 
economic causes, triggered by imbalanced governance. The analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the military, political, and economic approaches discussed in chapter four 
indicates that none of them alone is sufficient to solve the crisis. At the same time, they 
achieved some positive results. A mix of approaches is therefore vital to creating new 
dynamics to fix the inadequacies of past experiences. This final chapter therefore 
recommends strategic measures to respond to the crisis highlighting good governance, 
which will improve the effectiveness of the elites, the armed and security forces, and the 
civil society organization to responding to the crisis. 
A. ELITES 
As the armed and security forces request significant changes to attain expected 
results in the Malian case, so do the elites, who should combine the promotion of 
comprehensive development programs, youth education and employment, in order to 
enable to the armed and security forces to achieve their mission, and support mechanisms 
fighting against corruption. Therefore, Malian elites should: 
• Establish the National Security Council. As a strategic security and 
defense coordination tool, the NSC will response to the majority of the 
challenges encounter by the security and defense forces in their daily 
tasks. Bruneau et al., argue that the NSC has the role of informing and 
lightening the decisions of the executive, promote interagency 
cooperation, provide national defense plan and it execution, and promote 
its agenda through international cooperation.288 Thus, the enactment of 
the NSC will provide new roles and responsibilities converging to produce 
effective coordination in forces use, as well as intelligence sharing. In 
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addition, the NSC national security strategy will not only provide defense 
plan for the whole country, but also devises strategies to the specific case 
of Tuareg. 
• Provide comprehensive development programs for all regions. As the 
decentralization of power in previous peace agreements, creating a period 
of peace registered remarkable results, it is essential for elites to 
strengthen these achievements by consistently providing necessary 
resources and facilitating all of the regions’ economic independence so 
that they can undertake necessary activities for their growth. For that, 
priority should be given to the development of the transport infrastructures 
and an increase of the energy supply. The development of these sectors 
will not only facilitate the transport of goods from the producer to the 
consumers in the vast land mass of the country, but also ease the 
development of the agro-industry, which would create more opportunities 
and hope for better life among the population. Moreover, inclusive 
development should include the betterment of the quality of services that 
administrations are providing. The concept of the concentration of state 
administrative power in Bamako, which results in the mistrust and 
frustration of some regions feeling disadvantaged, will reduce if local 
services meet their expectations.  
• Promote youth education and employment. The increase in the number of 
graduating youth would decrease insurgents’ potential followers. As some 
of the terrorist combatants are recruited among students from French-
Arabic and Madrasa schools, elites should encourage and promote the 
integration of these students by the creation of a curriculum enabling them 
to join the job market. Because many combatants join the insurgent and 
terrorist groups because they lack opportunity, the promotion of education 
would enable many young people to attain an acceptable level of 
education that can grant them job opportunities. In this way, elites will 
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reduce the number of youth susceptible to being enrolled in the campaigns 
against the nation.  
• Budget for the new generation of equipment and consequent training to 
the forces. The military and security forces will not be able to succeed 
against the insurgency nexus of terrorism and organized crime without a 
useful update of their knowledge and materials. With new threats as 
hybrid, asymmetric and information warfare, to leverage innovation and 
supersede the enemy, Malian elites should invest in security forces’ 
operability. Providing essential equipment to the Joint Army Task Forces 
(GTIA), Special Anti-Terrorism Forces (FORSAT), and the Central 
Narcotic Agency (OCS), created for this circumstance, in addition to the 
remaining forces, would grant the military the possibility to reply 
effectively to the current enemy, as well as its funding. Thus, with 
adequate capability, armed and security forces will stress prevention by 
containing insurgents rather than intervention. Therefore, subsequent 
measures should accompany such new structures as the Specialized 
Judicial Pole against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crimes and 
the National Cell of Financial Information Processing (CENTIF). These 
structures with clear visibility of their attributes and the allocation of 
resources would perform what the precedent services failed to achieve. 
• Provide mechanisms enabling effective results against corruption. 
Previous attempts to provide economic relief to areas susceptible to 
insurgency were undermined by corruption, therefore eroding the peace. 
The strict implementation of laws and conventions and the enactment of 
anti-corruption measures proposed by the different anti-corruption 
structures will have positive effects. Despite the five anti-corruption 
bodies in Mali, the country occupies the rank of (116 out of 176 in the 
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world).289 Malian elites, by underscoring transparency in the management 
of states’ affairs and respecting the separation of the executive and judicial 
branch by stopping interference in judicial affairs, will ensure the 
independence of the judicial system and the chance to enable ant-
corruption brigades to perform impeccable investigations. However, the 
rigorous application of law without social status distinction should begin 
with law enforcement, public finances, and social services.  
B. ARMED AND SECURITY FORCES 
The complexity of the Malian crisis requires diversified military solutions 
encompassing the reform of the intelligence services, innovation in military capabilities, 
the development of the civil-military relationships, as well as regional and international 
cooperation. Armed and security forces, to attain effective responses to the Malian crisis 
should take the following actions:  
• Build a comprehensive intelligence agency. The failure of the 
counterinsurgency and terrorism in Nigeria was largely caused by 
ineffectiveness in intelligence collection and the sharing of data between 
the defense and security forces. The Malian intelligence apparatus displays 
some of the same problems as Nigeria’s. Solving this issue requires the 
creation of a central agency at the presidency level responsible for the 
coordination of the entire intelligence services and the promotion of 
civilian intelligence. The central agency would not only oversee the 
individual services but also reduce the misuse of intelligence to crack 
down on political opponents instead focusing on the independent 
collection and analysis of information necessary for the internal and 
external security of the country. The promotion of civilian intelligence by 
formalizing and providing incentives to involve them inside the defense 
and security forces would facilitate the collection of intelligence on 
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enemies embedded on the population. This approach would also facilitated 
the sharing of intelligence between armed and security forces and enforce 
dissemination with limit access to vital intelligence.  
• Modernize the countering strategy according to the threat. The asymmetric 
and terrorist methods used by insurgents demand that the security forces 
must innovate and implement new warfare styles. The development of 
technology today offers countless opportunities to the Malian forces to 
expand their techniques and strategies. To attain this objective, the use of 
unmanned devices in intelligence collection will produce effective results 
with utmost discretion within an acceptable timeframe in any steep terrain, 
which is inexpensive compared to regular spying. Also, the use of drones, 
armored vehicles, and robots would not only guarantee the precision of the 
strikes on targets, fewer casualties, and unwanted civilian deaths, but also 
increase security forces’ sustainability and reduce the logistics footprint.  
• Promote civil-military cooperation. Given the weakness of the Malian 
security forces as identified in Chapter 2, cooperation can be a strong 
rampart against terrorist groups. From the Malian standpoint, because the 
enemies are embedded in the population, the security forces would take 
advantage of the civil-military cooperation by providing incentives to 
civilians—in particular, giving them official status as employees of the 
security forces to report every suspect and suspicious conduct 
encountered. Cooperation would then ease the arrest of criminals before 
they proceed, preserving and protecting civilians from being targeted. 
Even with the latest generation of military technology, it will be difficult 
for the army to end a terrorist insurgency without the involvement of the 
population through strategic communication.  
• Strengthen regional and international cooperation. As an insurgency, 
terrorism and organized crimes are transnational threats, therefore the 
coordination of efforts could decrease the operability of the criminal 
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actors. NATO’s interoperability policy defines Joint Forces Operations as 
“the ability for allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently 
to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives.”290 With a 
common adversary, unified cooperation is less demanding—and often 
more effective—than when each country deals with the problem on its 
own. To attain this objective, starting from lessons learned, the regional 
military cooperation through sharing experiences will strengthen the 
capability of members to work on the case. On the one hand, even if Mali 
has limited resources to afford the latest generation of military technology, 
it can take advantage of international partners’ strengths to deter and fight 
the enemy while improving its security forces’ capabilities. On the other 
hand, the implementation of a joint operations’ strategy can contribute to 
defeating the terrorism scourge. Bordered by seven countries that have an 
interest in containing the crisis, the combination of military efforts can 
drive a lasting outcome.  
C. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 
Civil society is the barometer of the powers conferred to the military, executive, 
legislative, and judicial branch. By promoting good governance oversight, civil society 
compels state bureaucracy accountability. Civil society organizations, the media, and 
non-governmental organizations enact this process. Therefore, civil society should: 
• Oversee and report the daily activity of armed and security forces and 
prompt state reaction against any misconduct and violation of the 
established rules. As the case of Nigeria especially shows, abuses by the 
military is a challenge. Therefore, strengthening civilian control and 
oversight over the armed and security forces would decrease the number 
of human rights abuses in military operations. Currently, state government 
branches do not have strong control over the military and likely tolerate 
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some of its misconduct. This complicity from the executive, legislative 
and the judicial branches in controlling the military can be filled if the 
Civil Society Organizations effectively play their role. As a counterweight 
and with a different approach, civil society would guarantee the 
effectiveness of control by overseeing elites. To reach the goal of sound 
oversight, civil society should be organized in a single healthy body 
producing more powerful impacts rather than conducting several parallel 
movements that are easy to divert.  
• Foster internal and external oversight through the release of accurate 
information on elites’ management of the state’s affairs. The workability 
of civil organization oversight necessitates cooperation with the media. By 
sharing the daily activities of the bureaucracy with the population, the 
media would trigger internal oversight by providing information on 
important state decisions to citizens, who will react when collective 
interests are threatened. External oversight will be conducted by the 
cooperation of local and international media. Private domestic media 
companies sharing information with media abroad would help the 
international community to take action sooner rather than later. To attain 
effectiveness, media will take advantage of the new technologies of 
information that are cheap and accessible to the majority of the population. 
Effectiveness will also require the government to implement legal 
framework promoting free press.  
• Solicit the help of international NGOs and the media in their actions. Like 
the media, NGOs can play a significant role by strengthening institutions 
and empowering the local oversight apparatus. The cooperation between 
the NGOs and the local CSOs will reinforce the ability of people to hold 
civil servants and politicians accountable for their actions. To reach the 
ultimate goal and avoid the scattering of efforts, NGOs should form a joint 
group. Therefore, the group will identify the needs of the CSOs. 
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Regarding the competence of each organization, NGOs can provide 
training, seminars, and information to strengthen their capacity to 
implement effective control of the actions of governing elites. In addition, 
the international NGOs will prompt oversight and change by reporting any 
governance issues to their respective countries.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Overall, this research highlights the complexity of the nexus of insurgency 
terrorism and organized crime. As the majority of the insurgents’ grievances result from 
governance issues. One of the best solutions to the current crisis in Mali should start from 
good governance. The promotion of good governance in Mali will be a significant step in 
resolving the northern crisis, which is developing toward the south. The government, by 
playing its role of providing necessary and basic needs for the population and promoting 
inclusive development for the entire country, will create the conditions of stability. The 
military, elites, and the CSOs should stand together to exercise their authority as 
requested in democracy. Additionally, the military should be educated to face the new 
threats with the necessary expertise and equipment, while avoiding human rights abuses 
in their daily tasks and accepting civilian control, as well as the coordination of the 
intelligence services and the promotion of civilians in this activity. For their part, the 
elites should grant the armed and security forces the necessary equipment for their 
mission, provide the judicial branch significant support not only to fight against 
corruption but also enable the mechanism to control the whole law enforcement 
apparatus. For civil society, regarding the crucial role it occupies in framing the 
aforementioned measures, it is necessary to grant them necessary knowledge to 
contribute to the success of its mission. For the effectiveness of the CSOs, it is vital to 
distance it from politicians’ manipulation, which would hamper its watchdog mission. 
Finally, the combination of effective military, political, and economic reaction, with a 
significant regional and international cooperation will help Mali to response to the 
lingering crisis undermining its stability. 
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